Historical Challenges of Alarming Deadly Illegal Migration Crossing of African Youths Across the Sahara Desert – Mediterranean-Atlantic Pathways Versus Accelerated British Diplomacy of Illegal Migration Bill Facing Upright Internal and External Rejections of the Post-COVID-19 of the 21st Century

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Abstract: This paper deals with the historical challenges occurring from the plight of African youths illegal migratory adventures in search of where to survive in terms of white and blue collar jobs which are belief to be more sufficiently available in European countries which formerly enslaved, colonized and presently neo-colonising the same countries those youths originated from. Their voluntary risky attempts to cross the Sahara Desert, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to reach European targeted destinations are motivated by the lack of opportunities of encouraging labour markets since various governments within Sub-Saharan Africa can be capable of integrating all into the public sector and the fact that the private sectors also have their own specific challenges of absorbing the majority of the unemployed youths. The simple fact is that, this rampant illegal migration of African youths can be control provided the transformation sectors are more vibrant and boosting the economic growth and development. However, African leaders can once set up different research teams on the question of the long centuries of slavery and slave trade and the looting during the official partitioned and colonization of the Continent by Western European countries where the majority of the clandestine migrants are focused. To that effect, compensation to the over five century crimes committed by the actors can be transformed into developmental projects in respective countries. Each former colonial Master can be charged to settle her reparation not in terms of physical cash but with the construction of a number of transformation industries from raw materials gotten in the countries to finish products ready for the consumption markets within Africa and elsewhere. Within this project, an equivalent number of African smuggled and slaughtered during the previous centuries can be diverted to equivalent number of the contemporary youths to work in those industries instead of making unleashing attempt of illegal migration which ended half way in the deep seas and oceans. Historically, most African labourers were transported through the seas, dragged as lucks of woods, cargoes with chain on their legs, hands and necks as none ever enter the real aircraft to the plantations. Recently, the fabrications of boats, still by the Europeans are use as mode of transportations of Africans as those boats are not made by Africans but European businessmen. The solution may not be an effective illegal migration bills as taking the case of the British, but how to remedy with a solutions which can make those youths to stay, work and live in their respective countries in favour of Nation-Building. That is why, we raise recommendations on the reflections of the previous slavery, colonial and neo-colonial atrocities earlier committed by the actors with reparation paid in terms of developmental projects to enable the governments employ their citizens. The British as a case study best know what they did in their own time to Africans and most tribes are in unwanted conflicts because of their presence at the time using the policy of Indirect Rule with historical negligence as sources of conflicts and misinterpretations of the 21st Century in some countries. The British Government has been facing upright internal and external opposition to BIMB which if not revise can bring setbacks to open conflict escalations in African countries which signed accord of deportation of black migrants from United Kingdom to prison camps like those in Rwanda.

Keywords: Historical Challenges, Illegal Migration, Pathways, British Diplomacy, colonial atrocities, reparation, transformation industries, youths, conflict. COVID-19.

INTRODUCTION

The history of international migration especially from the post-COVID-19 era since 2021 apparently registered a huge number of African youths escaping from the countries to search for greener pastures which in turns become the worst greener death of the time thereby inflicting psychological tortures with misunderstandings within the families. This situation has called for the attention of different African governments and the international communities to start thinking of the way forward to solve the plight of the youths especially on the challenges of high rate of unemployment and the manner of national integration into different sectors of the economy.

Although, rampant corruption, nepotism, ethnic considerations and all sort of socio-cultural influences are still stronger in most African countries and the most sufferings are often classed under minority groups with no substantial influential position to survive their people. These situations among others acted as both push and pull factors where the youths voluntarily decided to offer their lives to tilipias and animals in the sesa and desert when caught by the inability to meet up with their clandestine migratory pathways. At the same time, is is not the best solution for those youths because some are barely lazy and can not make initiatives of personal creativity and

exercising patience, but one to be rich at all course.. Notwithstanding the mobility limitations accompanying the COVID-19 pandemic restriction, migrants continue to embark on clandestine risky journeys thereby hoping to be escaping from the existing conflicts and hardship in their home countries searching of a more stable and easy life elsewhere in Europe.

Although many deaths attributable to COVID-19 infection among migrants' workers have been underreported, it has been estimated that over 2,500 migrants have died during migration in 2020, as measures to contain the pandemic, such as lockdowns and travel restrictions, have increased the risks and uncertainties associated with these journeys. Numerous fatalities among migrant workers associated with COVID-19 infection and related measures were not included in this figure. The Agadez Region in Niger is experiencing the consequences of destabilization in the Sahel by armed groups while being the gateway to Europe for most Africans. Given its size (half of the country land), Agadez is a major challenge for epidemiological surveillance. As migration is a contributing factor to the spread of COVID-19 disease we hypothesized that forcibly displaced persons are at increased risk for COVID-19 infection in Agadez. In a retrospective study of the health data of the national health information system (supplemented as needed by consultation registers), we reviewed all COVID-19 positive migrant patient records admitted from 1st May to 8th December 2020. Of note, medical checks were performed at seven entrance gates on all incoming passengers by trained health workers. A team of 58 officers with different backgrounds under the direction of the referring physician managed confirmed cases. **(Batoure, *et al*., 2021),** The increased controls resulted in the diversification of routes, methods and departure points. Practically all Tunisian beaches were used by migrant smugglers as departure points at a time when controls were slacker. Among these locations, the small port of Haouaria, located at the extreme north-western point of Tunis facing Sicily, was chosen for its proximity to Italy despite the navigational risks on the approach to the straits of Sicily. The departure point was often chosen according to area of residence, contact networks and also opportunity. The change of destination towards Lampedusa, the diversification of departure points for Libya and the choice of ports located in the centre of Tunisia resulted from increased controls by the Tunisian authorities and

Italian and European coastguards. This is why, over the past few years, and more particularly, the past three years, the vast majority of boats sailed from the centre or southern regions of Tunisia or Libya to the Island of Lampedusa. Mehdi Mabrouk[13] divides the departure points into three zones: The first zone groups together the North-eastern region including the Cap Bon. Migrants have a preference for this region because Kelibia in Tunisia is only 60 km away from the Island of Pantelleria. However, the whole of the north coast, including beaches as well as ports, was used for departure points. As an example, of the 3561 migrants, 1260 left from this coastline in 2006. **(Dourgnon & Kassar, 2014).** The second zone, known as the greater Sahel region, is an urban tourist area recognized as being a historical migration hub. Several ports and beaches are used as departure points for clandestine migrants. These include the forests of Ben Hmid, Moknine and Sayada and the ports and beaches of Chebba, Skhira and Sidi Mansour. The third zone is in the south and extends from the Gulf of Gabes to the Libyan border, a region of traders and fishermen historically renowned as a transit zone for internal and international migrations, which has become since 2011 one of the major departure points for migrant smuggling. It includes the Island of Djerba and the Zarziz-Ben Guerddene region**. (Khachani, 2010).**

Libya as a whole can be added as a migration zone connected to Tunisia, as Tunisian networks, especially those based in the south, are closely connected to Libyan networks. In addition, the 'Rais' or smugglers are in the majority Tunisian, even if the boats are Libyan. These departure points that form part of the migratory space vary according to the strategies developed by the smugglers and also the migrants themselves.**(Dourgnon & Kassar, 2014**). It is estimated that several tens of thousands of sub-Saharan migrants annually transit via Morocco to reach Spain. Since the mid-1990s, Morocco has progressively become a country of transit for these migrants that form a mixed group of asylum seekers, refugees and an increasing number of labour migrants.(**Kassar, *et al*., 2014**). In general, they enter Morocco from Algeria from the border at the east of Oujda after having crossed the Sahara by road, generally via Nigeria. On their arrival in Morocco, a great many migrants attempt to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla by climbing the fences that separate them from Morocco. According to the International

Organization for Migrations, the number of sub-Saharan migrants, varying in number from 10 000 to 20 000 migrants, has become noticeable in Morocco. A survey conducted by Association Marocaine d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations (Moroccan Association for Studies and Research on Migration) (AMERM) in 2007 estimates that, 'Nigerian nationals remain the most numerous (15.7%) followed by Malians (13.1%). Other nationals are represented as follows: Senegalese (12.8%), Congolese (10.4%), Ivoirians (9.2%), Guineans (7.3%) and Cameroonians (7%), followed in smaller numbers by Gambians (4.6%), Ghanaians (4.5%), Liberians (3.8%) and Sierra Leoneans (3.1%)'. The survey also revealed the presence of migrants from 13 additional nationalities but in minor proportions. It is estimated that illegal migratory flows in Morocco concern almost 40 different nationalities. Recently, migrants from Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have transited via Morocco by the Saharan route.(**Kassar & Dourgnon**, **2014**). The deadliest immigration path in the world remains the central Mediterranean-some 580 people perished on this route between March and October 2020. Hereby, we provide an earlier insight of COVID-19 infection among migrants in Agadez Region, Niger. We found that migrants are more likely of being young and at increased risk for SARS-COV-2 infection. In addition to language as barrier to quality of care access in the emergence room mental health has been of concern among migrants worldwide. The continuous arrival of migrant in this region makes hard contact tracing of positive cases. Moreover, considering the substantial positivity rate observed, the current over-whelmed site (Assamaka-Alit) might not be able of providing necessary infection and prevention controls measures such as observing physical distance. It is therefore a call for stakeholders involved in the region and for the African Union leadership to address the crisis and to consider migrants in the COVID-19 vaccination program (Batoure, *et al.*, **2021; Batoure, *et al.*, 2021; & Reid, *et al.*, 2021).**

According to Boampong, et al., (2020)**,** the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on travel and the closure of borders by some countries have disrupted or delayed migration within Africa and outside Africa. However, for young Africans experiencing multiple shocks with little or no social protection, the prospects of migrating may increase, especially for families seeking to mitigate socioeconomic challenges. While the African migration narrative may be dominated by desperate youth involved in irregular migration, the near-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on them has also increased the migration of certain groups, especially those with skills useful in the health sector of destination countries. For instance, between March and April 2020, some countries in the West offered work or exchange visitor visas to encourage people with medical training and expertise to migrate. "After completing my nursing training in Ghana, I came across this government scheme looking for health workers to go work in the UK. On top of offering us a job, they provided us with the necessary support, including accommodation in the UK. Since I arrived in the UK everyone has been supportive, including my family and friends," says 29-year-old Ghanaian David Kwesi. Mr. Kwesi's experience mirrors that of many other young Africans migrating to the West to work in the health sector. Once employed, these migrants play a key role in supporting their families back home through remittances. Yet, the migration process is not that easy for many others. Many young African migrants have been forced to return to their countries of origin amid precarious job conditions and lack of access to a safety net, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Boampong insisted that migration amid COVID-19, young Africans weigh their options on new challenges and opportunities as the world marks the International Migrants Day Reports have emerged of poor access to healthcare, as well as abuse and scapegoating of African migrants in some countries in Middle East and Asia._ Migrants employed as domestic workers in those regions face an increased risk of abuse, with some stranded in destination countries while others seek the fastest way out. On his part, Lanre Ikuteyijo in 2023 illustrated that " Nigerian youth constitute one of the largest populations among migrants travelling from countries of the global South to Europe. Why are these young people deciding to leave their country? Are they aware of the dangers they may encounter en route? As the most worriedly questions which needs to be known by any illegal migrants and researcher from the author's findings. In addition, on irregular migration as survival strategy: Narratives from Youth in urban Nigeria, published in 2019 Carried out in four major Nigerian cities – Lagos, Ibadan, Ile-Ife and Benin City chosen for their characteristics in relation to irregular migration, the study focused on 15- to 35-year-olds. All those interviewed were susceptible to irregular migration – they were either unemployed, in their final year

of tertiary education or engaged in the compulsory National Youth Service Corps (**Ikuteyijo, 2023).** The young people who fell into one or more of these categories expressed fear of the future, and viewed migration as a survival strategy to escape an existence of poverty and powerlessness. The study also included youth who had left the country and then returned – either voluntarily, or because they had been deported. The first lesson learned was that most of these youth were unfamiliar with formal, legal immigration processes. More than half of them did not own valid passports, a minimum requirement for safe and legal international migration. They knew, however, that it was possible to migrate illegally, or, as they say in Nigeria, "travelling to Europe by road". Most of them knew someone who had left the country illegally, using forged travel documents, or the services of human traffickers or smugglers. The consensus was that "the end justifies the means". Most of the youth did not consider irregular migration a crime, but a practical solution that was "diplomatic" or "smart." Their strong motivation to migrate meant they failed to see the risks of an illegal journey, making them easy prey for human trafficking cartels. Most of the youth did not consider irregular migration a crime, but a practical solution that was 'smart'. These economic realities, coupled with other variables such as political instability, rising waves of conflict – and now, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic – have led to an increasing number of youth in certain categories leaving Nigeria for other countries perceived to hold greater promise. Most respondents who left Nigeria illegally said they were completely unaware of what lay ahead. Many of those who came back recounted horrendous stories of their attempts to reach Europe. Jessica, a 30-year-old woman who had returned from Italy, reported that six of the girls she had travelled with, died at sea. A hundred and sixty girls were transported in three ships. Two of the ships developed mechanical faults in the middle of the sea, and six girls died before the ships could be rescued. The surviving girls were eventually picked up by prospective patrons or employers, illicit or otherwise, when the ship finally berthed in Madrid, Spain.(**Ikuteyijo, 2022).**

Irregular migration occurs outside the regulatory norms of the origin, transit, or destination country and can refer to three groups of migrants: those who arrive in a clandestine fashion (i.e., enter and stay illegally in the considered country), those who arrive legally (for instance, on the basis of tourist or student visas) and then overstay the period for which their visa/ permits are valid, and asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected and who have not left the country as required (Ikuteyijo, 2013). The criminalization of irregular migration involves punishments ranging from imprisonment to outright deportation. Apart from economic push factors, the trend toward the securitization and militarization of borders as a measure to check illegal entry into countries of the Global North has been identified as another major driver of. Historically, these norms, which stipulate documentation and other requirements, have been subject to change. For instance, moving from Nigeria to the United Kingdom required no visa until the introduction of the entry visa requirement soon after independence.(**Ikuteyijo, 2020),** Irregular migration. Securitization includes the use of modern security infrastructure, such as the closed-circuit television for surveillance (**Akhigbe & Effevottu, 2023).**The continued criminalization of irregular migration is seen as another factor that incentivizes perpetrators to devise means of evading security agents according to Davitti, *et al.*, in 2018. The migration of the youth is also precipitated by the recruitment of foreign labor by Global North countries where the twin factors of an aging Irregular migration can involve acute hardship, such as wilderness trekking and crossing waterways in unsafe vessels. The Mediterranean Sea has become one of the most popular routes for irregular migrants in recent times (**Brenner, *et al.*, 2018**). The role that remittances play in providing economic security for families has been well documented (Akanle, *et al.*, 2021; Singh, 2017; Olowa, *et al.*, 2013; & Odorige, 2016). Remittances serve as a basic means of livelihood for family members left behind, as they are often used to establish and support private businesses and self-employment (Oyebamiji & Asuelime, 2018; Ikuteyijo, 2020; & Ndisika & Dawodu, 2019). Remittances in the form of cash or goods also constitute a basic source of income that covers the family's necessities of food, clothing and shelter and may allow them to acquire land and property (**Odorige, 2016; & Ndisika & Dawodu, 2019).**

In the age of globalization, it is quite easy for events at one end of the world to affect decisions at other ends of the world. This explains why events in some parts of the world, notably in Africa and other developing regions, shape policies in Europe and vice versa. Migration, which has been described as a global process given

its ubiquitous nature, has shaped a number of policies by the both the departure and receiving countries.(**Ikuteyijo, 2014),** Unauthorized immigration to Europe went down at the peak of the pandemic. As EU countries reopen, migrant flows are back up. What does it mean for the EU — and for migrants? The EU could see a surge in migrants arriving as the pandemic gradually ebbs Image: picture-alliance/AP Photo/P. Giannakouris For the many in Europe who have weathered the waves of the coronavirus pandemic, being in a crowd once again is a surreal feeling. As European countries emerge from the peaks of the pandemic, the masks are off and lockdowns seem to be a thing of the past. With high vaccination rates, many European Union countries are facing a brave new post-COVID-19 future. While COVID-19 closures significantly reduced flows of illegal immigration to Europe in 2020, those numbers are now increasing as 2021 progresses. And not only are migrants making up for lost time — it seems the coronavirus pandemic may become a significant factor in increasing migration, including along dangerous sea routes. Add to this the vulnerability of migrants and the economic impacts, and the EU could be facing a perfect post-COVID-19 migration storm.(Diehn**, 2021),** More than a year and a half after the start of the pandemic, a body of data and analysis points to how COVID-19 restrictions in European countries affected migrants and asylum-seekers. Border controls, travel restrictions, and other efforts to stem the spread of the virus initially significantly reduced migration to Europe. In 2020, "the EU as a whole registered a 33% year-on-year decrease in asylum applications," the European Commission reported at the start of 2021 Meanwhile, irregular border crossings dropped to rates not seen since 2013, the commission continued. This also included some troubling developments for human rights. Many asylum offices and consulates closed, while some ports were declared unsafe. Asylum-seekers were unable to lodge claims in some cases. Limits on the freedom of movement at times trapped asylum-seekers in unsanitary conditions, for example on Lesbos; or they were quarantined offshore at arrival countries (Diehn, **2021**). Recent data from EU border agency Frontex paints a different picture for 2021 so far. According to Frontex, January through August 2021 saw a 64% increase in irregular migration to the EU over the previous year. Traffic over the western Balkan route — which runs via Turkey through Balkan countries such as Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia — and in the central Mediterranean route nearly doubled. But not only did coronavirus measures reduce immigration to Europe, it also altered the flows. Specifically, border closures in Greece pushed people away from the eastern Mediterranean. And into the more deadly central Mediterranean — that is, via North Africa to Italy — where many migrants lose their lives at sea. "The relaxation of COVID restrictions is a key factor in the overall increase of arrivals," Frontex told DW. Meanwhile, the eastern Mediterranean saw a decrease in illegal border crossings, likely related to Greece's border closures. Of the circa 41,000 people registered to have crossed through the dangerous central Mediterranean route illegally so far in 2021, the largest group by far were Tunisians. After that, Bangladesh and Egypt were the top countries of origin. Libya and Tunisia were the main countries of departure. Mirroring that doubling of illegal crossings via the central Mediterranean route from 2020 to 2021, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 1,163 migrants missing at sea in the region through September of this year — compared to 619 sea deaths over the same time period last year.

The officials of IOM keep asking series of questions pertaining to the problem of clandestine migration. As follows: "What we are unfortunately seeing is yet another year where more than 1,000 people have died needlessly," said Julia Black, a project officer at the IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Center (GMDAC). The western Balkan route also saw twice as many illegal crossings compared to the previous year. Most of those were migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Morocco. Crossings by land from Belarus to Poland have also spiked — this represents a separate situation that is specifically connected to geopolitical retaliation on the part of Belarus strongman Alexander Lukashenko. Although this crossing involves a relatively small number of people, concerns about human rights violations are growing around that route. "The central Mediterranean route is particularly affected by the economic downturn due to the pandemic in the geographically associated regions and (related) political developments acting as push factors in major countries of origin and transit," Frontex said. Some analysts concur that COVID-19 has been a driving factor. "It is safe to say that COVID has increased and will increase push and pull factors that drive irregular migration towards Europe," said Martin Hofmann, a senior adviser at the International Center for Migration Policy

Development (ICMPD). "In Tunisia, for instance, the decline in tourism and the subsequent decline in income prompted a significant number of Tunisians to try to reach Europe in an irregular way," Hofmann added. Loss of tourist revenue due to the coronavirus crisis has been a significant push factor for Tunisians coming to Europe Image: Wassim jdidi/Panoramic/imago images. Another major migration factor is uneven economic recovery forcing people to seek income opportunities abroad. "First trends speak for increasing imbalances that create more push and pull factors for migration toward the rich (and faster-recovering) countries of the Global North," Hofmann told DW. "Economic and social repercussions generated by the pandemic in many third countries, both of origin and transit, are likely to continue to fuel migration flows," Frontex added. Such increased migration flows, in turn, have impacts on the economy and on the spread of COVID-19 (Diehn, **2021**). A key point is how migrants are more vulnerable to and more affected by the spread of COVID-19. "In the case of irregular and low-skilled migrants, their living and working conditions tend to mean that the incidence rate of COVID-19 infections, and unfortunately also of deaths among this particular group of migrants, tend to be higher than among non-migrants," said Asha Manoharan, a data analyst at the IOM GMDAC. Irregular migrants also tend to have very limited access to health care, including COVID-19 vaccinations, Manoharan said. IOM has found that "only 33% of 152 countries globally included irregular migrants in their official national vaccination plans," she added. Yet "migrants are a vital part of the labor force in Europe and across the world," Manoharan told DW. European agriculture is dependent on migrant workers, such as this strawberry picker from MoroccoImage: AFP/Getty Images An estimated 13% of all key workers in the EU are immigrants, making them an important part of the COVID-19 response. Beyond that, many EU countries rely on seasonal migrant workers which had an impact fact during the first pandemic harvest season. Taken together, the vulnerability of immigrants to COVID-19 has knock-on effects that ripple through the EU economy. The most effective way to address this, Black told DW, is by addressing the instability that drives irregular migration, for example in North African countries. Countries in the EU and beyond could implement some concrete policy responses to address migrants' vulnerability to COVID-19, such as "specifically including irregular migrants in health

care and vaccination plans," Manoharan concluded. (Diehn, **2021**)**.**

1.Description of the Diverse Pathways and Illustrative Risky Images of African Youths Engagement on Illegal Migration Crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea

In several countries, concerns about rising irregular migration and how the public perceives it may fuel nationalism and radicalization. After the announcement of a controversial asylum partnership between the United Kingdom and Rwanda, the German government appointed a Special Commissioner for Migration in charge of addressing asylum requests which numbered 244,000 in 2022, increasing regular migration and "significantly" reducing irregular migration. Policy responses discussed include quotas for legal immigrants and the return of people rescued from the Mediterranean Sea to countries in North Africa, where their asylum procedures would be processed in exchange for benefits such as advantages in visa applications or better trade relations.(Illegal   immigration,   Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Ill...).

A mutually satisfactory outcome between Africa and the EU is unlikely, at least in the short and medium term. In several African economies, remittances have become the largest source of external financing, outpacing aid and investment flows. Many regimes see emigration as a release valve amid high youth unemployment and political discontent. And while migration tends to benefit both origin and destination countries, illegal flows are increasingly perceived as a political risk across the EU. **(Pinto, 29 June, 2022).** Migration is driven mainly by economics, and, in the short to medium term, higher food and energy prices across Africa will remain important push factors. Refugee flows into the EU are expected to increase following the devastating earthquakes in Syria and Turkey. Under this most likely scenario, collective efforts to manage asylum applications, reduce irregular flows and secure European borders will intensify,   through   partnerships   with   third countries, strengthening the Frontex border agency and its deployments abroad. EU member states will increasingly introduce policies to reduce illegal immigration while adapting migrant flows to specific economic needs. More countries will follow the UK's lead in attempting to externalize the management of asylum requirements and irregular flows. Increasingly, refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants will be treated differently.   Several   states   will   likely   adopt

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legislation to make sure that the profile of economic migrants matches the needs of the host country. In France, for example, immigration law will provide for the creation of residence permits for "professions under strain." Germany is simplifying immigration rules for skilled workers and introducing a points-based system that mandates knowledge of the German language. This scenario has two main risks. For one, schemes to attract migrants into specific sectors will be ineffective without more flexible labor markets. And – as seen after the disintegration of Libya – externalizing migration controls creates vulnerabilities for European security and weakens European soft power by creating the appearance of a double standard. **(Pinto, 29 June, 2022).**

Illegal immigration is the migration of people into a country in violation of that country's immigration laws, or the continuous residence in a country without the legal right to. Illegal immigration tends to be financially upward, from poorer to richer countries. Illegal residence in another country creates the risk of detention, deportation, and/or other sanctions. Asylum seekers who are denied asylum may face impediment to expulsion if the home country refuses to receive the person or if new asylum evidence emerges after the decision. In some cases, these people are considered illegal aliens. **.**
(Illegal immigration, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Ill...).

In others, they may receive a temporary residence permit, for example regarding the principle of non-refoulement in the International Refugee Convention. The European Court of Human Rights, referring to the European Convention on Human Rights, has shown in a number of indicative judgments that there are enforcement barriers to expulsion to certain countries, for example, due to the risk of torture.(Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). Illegal immigrants are not impoverished by the standards of their home countries. The poorest classes in a developing country may lack the resources needed to mount an attempt to cross illegally, or the connections to friends or family already in the destination country. Studies from the Pew Hispanic Center have shown that the education and wage levels of illegal Mexican immigrants in the US are around the median for Mexico and that they are not a suitable predictor of one's choice to immigrate. **(Tackling unauthorized migration from Africa DW, https://www.dw.com › undocument...).**

Other examples do show that increases in poverty, especially when associated with immediate crises, can increase the likelihood of illegal migration. The 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, after the start of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was associated with widespread poverty and a lower valuation for the peso relative to the dollar. It also marked the start of a massive swell in Mexican immigration, in which net illegal migration to the US increased every year from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. Illegal immigrants usually have no or very limited access to public health systems, proper housing, education and banks. For instance, the current international human rights framework stipulates in various documents that the right to health and access to healthcare is fundamental and independent of a person's legal status. However, on a domestic level, many States in Europe have established the right to health as a welfare right, making it subject to citizenship or other administrative requirements. Whether it's due to the danger behind disclosing their status or because of the inherently unfair social infrastructures, these barriers are present in all types of services, from social security to health. (**European migrant crisis, 2015**). People have been kidnapped or tricked into slavery to work as laborers, after entering the country, for example in factories. Those trafficked in this manner often face additional barriers to escaping slavery, since their status as undocumented immigrants makes it difficult for them to gain access to help or services. In some regions, people that are still en route to their destination country are also sometimes kidnapped, for example for ransom. In some instances, they are also tortured, raped, and killed if the requested ransom does not arrive. One case in point is the Eritrean migrants that are en route to Israel. A large number of them are captured in North Sinai (Egypt) and Eastern Sudan and held in the buildings in North Sinai. Most countries have laws requiring workers to have proper documentation, often intended to prevent or minimize the employment of undocumented immigrants. However, the penalties against employers are often small and the acceptable identification requirements are vague, ill-defined and seldom checked or enforced, making it easy for employers to hire illegal labor, although repeat offenders may receive harsher punishment. **(Wirtz, 2020).** Additionally, if an employer does not maintain proper safety standards, refuses to pay, or creates overall precarious working conditions, looking for remedies or redress would also mean the risk of having to disclose their

status. In other words, undocumented migrants are not protected by labour standards and regulations as people with legal status are. Where the minimum wage is several times the prevailing wage in the home country, employers sometimes pay less than the legal minimum wage or have unsafe working conditions, relying on the reluctance of illegal workers to report the violations to the authorities. Undocumented employees' ability to work legally no longer exists, which makes it easier for corporations to take advantage of their services. Unfair and unjust, the exploitation of undocumented immigrants' labor goes unpunished because they are not considered legal immigrants. Some people enter into sham marriages, whereby marriage is contracted into for purely immigration advantage by a couple who are not in a genuine relationship. Common reasons for sham marriages are to gain immigration (i.e., immigration fraud), residency, work, or citizenship rights for one or both of the spouses or other benefits.(**European Migrant Crisis, 2015).**

The 'new normal' in Africa's regular or irregular migration can be directly traced to the last two decades according to Nwalutu, *et al.*, (2022). This involves a massive transnational migration of Africans, including Nigerians, to other parts of the world, especially Europe, through illegal routes, porous land borders, the Sahara, and across the Mediterranean into Europe, or through legalised routes with the required documents. The irregular migration culture is a notorious endeavour that, over the years, has led to the deaths of many Nigerians and fellow 'backway' migrants in the Sahara Desert, the Maghreb region, and the Mediterranean as stated by Awosusi, *et al.*, (2021); Ikuteyijo, (2020); & Okunade & Bakare, (2021a). The inadequate national and economic restructuring, among others, to address the cross-border menace has further put many African states in a situation of fragility. Beyond the age-long irregular migration trend, many Nigerians are desperately paying 'the price' for legal migration from the country for the golden fleece abroad. This is not to say that the culture of irregular migration has become extinct on the continent; indeed, scores of Nigerians and other African nationals, especially from the West Africa sub-region, are daily leaving the country through irregular means.(Okunade & Awosusi, 2023). Neoliberalism, Globalization, and Financialization: Understanding Post-1980 Capitalism," David Kotz explicates the idea of neoliberalism with a focus on the United States. Neoliberalism involves creating an economic structure that weakens the functioning of public systems and institutions such that they become inefficient while private businesses and companies operate freely within the market, making a maximum profit with optimal performance. This implies that employee-employer relations decline and unions' role in determining wages and working conditions becomes marred. Consequently, the determination of working conditions and wages was left in the hands of market forces as opposed to labour-management negotiation in a regulated capitalist era, giving employers the free will to institutionalize the casualisation of workers according to Kotz in 2015. Explaining this within the context of the UK, the government/public funding of educational institutions in the country has been a subject of debate advanced by Brazzill in 2021. Among other things, the UK government took away funding decisions of schools from the elected Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to the schools as stated by Royna in 1995 and imposed per capita funding on students, deepening the inequalities witnessed in the state, making the rich richer and the poor coming poorer as held by Whitty, *et al.*, (1998) since. Entrance into UK tertiary institutions, thus, requires top-up fees. By implication, tertiary institutions have become racialised and hierarchised, segregating the poor from attending such universities and restricting them to universities that fall under the country's lower divisions of higher education Hill & Rosskam, (2009).(**Samuel, et al., 2023**).Finally, if the UK government eventually produces a policy to prevent Nigerian migrants from bringing their dependents with them into the UK, the implications may be grievous for the migrants and the Nigerian state. (**Why the U.K.'s 'Illegal Migration Bill' Is Probably Illegal, Time Magazine, https://time.com › uk-illegal-migrat...).** Aside from the fact that the rate of divorce and broken marriages will peak, the number of vulnerable populations in the country will increase. Considering that the Nigerian Government does not have a structure or system that caters for citizens' essential needs, most of the children left behind by their parents might become vulnerable to criminal gangs such as rapists, kidnappers, bandits, and terrorists in their quest to survive in an insecure country. (**Samuel, et al., 2023**).

There are approximately 610,000 illegal migrants smuggled into Libya, and a trade in migrant's organs does exist, speakers at a debate in Tripoli

on illegal migration said Wednesday. The debate was organised by the Al-Inma Organization for Supporting Youth and Women. The debate was attended by Adviser to the Cabinet Minister of State for Migration Affairs and Rapporteur of the Supreme Committee for Combating Illegal Immigration, Ghaith Al-Sakbi, Representative of the Coast Guard and Port Security at the Ministry of Defence, Brigadier General Bahar Masoud Abdel Samad, Director of Scientific Affairs at the International Humanitarian Law Centre, Hamid Al-Murabit, representative of the Chairman of the National Committee for Drawing up Policies and Strategies on Immigration, the head of the Development Organization for the Support of Youth and Women, Samira Al-Masoudi, and several interested and immigration specialists. The attendees discussed many issues related to illegal migration and its political, security, social and economic repercussions, as well as the latest developments and policies related to migration. Illegal migration affects many countries – boats are coffins of death For his part, the Director of Scientific Affairs at the International Humanitarian Law Centre, Ahmid Al-Zaidani, confirmed to the Libya Herald that the file of illegal migration is one of the most sensitive files in all countries of the world. (**Approximately 610000 illegal migrants smuggled into ..., Libya Herald, https://libyaherald.com › Libya**). He said many countries around the world suffer from its social, humanitarian, security and economic repercussions, most notably the African countries that suffer from poverty and political instability and high rates of unemployment and corruption. All of which push African youth to cross the desert from their countries towards Libya and from there to Europe across the Mediterranean in boats that are like coffins of death. 610,000 illegal immigrants present in Libya? Al-Zaidani added that there are approximately 610,000 illegal migrants present in Libya who entered at the hands of African smugglers, among them those who want to work inside Libya to provide enough for their families in their countries, and some of them want to migrate in death boats to Europe after collecting some money from inside Libya Sahel-Saharan Summit in Tripoli discusses challenges of labour, migration and ways to confront them Watch towers along Tunisian border activated to combat illegal migration and smuggling Illegal migrants originate from African, Arab and Asian countries He pointed out that illegal migration does not originate solely from Africa, but also comes from Arab states such as Syria, Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen, and Asian origins, especially from Bangladesh. As for the numbers of migrants in general, he admitted that they are inaccurate because it is not possible to count those who entered secretly and are present in the country in an illegal way. (**Approximately 610000 illegal migrants smuggled into ..., Libya Herald, https://libyaherald.com › Libya**).

There is a danger in not addressing the illegal migration problem Al-Zaidani highlighted the danger of not addressing the problems of migrants in Libya by the competent authorities and developing ways to combat clandestine immigration. This needs to be done in cooperation with international organizations and countries affected by waves of migrants in Europe, by creating development in migrant countries in Africa, addressing their living and economic conditions and creating job opportunities in their countries. Illegal migration has serious implications for Libya He added that Libya is one of the countries most affected by migrants, and their presence in these numbers has serious security implications. There are those who exploit migrants in actions that harm security and local community peace, especially by some armed gangs that work to exploit immigrants to work among their members in theft and armed robbery. Al-Zaidani said this security harm is reflected negatively in destroying the Libyan economy, in addition to the fact that every clandestine migrant costs thousands of dinars in migrant shelters. Organ trafficking Al-Zaidani said that there is confirmed news that international gangs obtain human organs belonging to illegal migrants from local gangs suspected of working in the field of trafficking in human organs. He said this is common in many countries considered a route for migrants. Al-Zaidani called for research and investigation into the matter and for those involved in these crimes to be referred to the judiciary so that they are punished and so that Libya does not become a country for international gangs that trade in human organs.

More than 2,500 dead, missing as 186,000 cross Mediterranean in 2023. UN refugee agency says 'no end in sight' to the lives lost in Mediterranean and on land routes to sea departure points. Eighteen people on a small wooden boat near the Italian island of Lampedusa, in the Mediterranean Sea, in 2021 , File: Juan Medina/Reuters, 29 September 2023. More than 2,500 people have died or gone missing while trying to cross the

Mediterranean to Europe so far this year, the UN refugee agency said, while approximately 186,000 people have arrived in European countries during the same period. Ruven Menikdiwela, director of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in New York, told the UN Security Council on Thursday that of the 186,000 who had crossed the Mediterranean, 83 percent – some 130,000 people – landed in Italy. Other countries where people who had crossed the Mediterranean had landed included Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Malta. The number of those who died or went missing during the dangerous sea crossing has surged this year compared with last year, the Security Council was told. "By September 24, over 2,500 people were accounted as dead or missing in 2023 alone," Menikdiwela said. That number marked a large increase over the 1,680 who died or went missing in the same period in 2022. (). Menikdiwela said the UN refugee agency saw "no end in sight" to the lives lost at sea and on land routes to Europe, which are similarly dangerous. The UNHCR official told the council how the land journey from sub-Saharan African countries to sea crossing departure points on the Tunisian and Libyan coasts "remains one of the world's most dangerous". "Lives are also lost on land, away from public attention," Menikdiwela said.(Al Jazeera, 2023). The migrants and refugees "risk death and gross human rights violations at every step", she said. More than 102,000 people attempted to cross the Mediterranean from Tunisia, a 260 percent increase from last year, and more than 45,000 had tried to cross from Libya, Menikdiwela said. The UNHCR figures were similar to those presented by Par Liljert, director of the International Office for Migration (IOM). **("EU's External Borders in 2022: Number of Irregular Border Crossings Highest Since 2016," Frontex, January 13, 2023, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-s-external-borders-in-2022-number-of-irregular-border-crossings-highest-since-2016-YsAZ29** "Recent IOM data demonstrates that from January to September 2023, more than 187,000 individuals crossed the Mediterranean in pursuit of a better future and the promise of safety," Liljert told the Security Council. "Tragically, during this same period, IOM recorded 2,778 deaths, with 2,093 of them occurring along the treacherous central Mediterranean route," he said, referring to the most dangerous sea crossing. "Yet, despite its clear dangers, in 2023, there has been an increase in arrivals to Greece along this route of over 300

percent, while the number of arrivals in Spain has remained steady, primarily through the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands as compared to the numbers recorded at the same time last year," he said. IOM also witnessed a significant increase in arrivals to Italy, with 130,000 so far this year compared with some 70,000 in 2022. (**Al Jazeera and news agencies, 2024 Al Jazeera Media Network).**

Quantifying irregular migration and smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa, The geography of migrant smuggling routes, Profiles and characteristics of smuggled migrants, Smuggler-migrant relationships, Organizational structures of migrant-smuggling networks, Modus operandi of migrant smugglers, Smuggling fees, Human and social costs of smuggling(**United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, 2010).** Most African migration is to economic hubs on the continent, a pattern that can be expected to continue as regional economies become more integrated. African migration has been on a steady upward trajectory for the past two decades. The record level of over 40 million African migrants represents a 30-percent increase from 2010. Given continuing strong push factors, that trend can be expected to continue in 2023. While often unrecognized, most African migration occurs within the continent as migrants seek employment opportunities in neighboring regional economic hubs. In fact, 80 percent of African migrants do not have an interest in leaving the continent. Africa accounts for only 14 percent of the global migrant population, compared to 41 percent from Asia and 24 percent from Europe. South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria are among the top five destination countries on the continent, revealing their position as economic hubs for their respective subregions. With the exception of Côte d'Ivoire, migrants make up less than 5 percent of the population in each of the top destination countries. The majority of migrants in Côte d'Ivoire are from neighboring (**Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9 January, 2023).** An estimated 15 percent of African migrants, mostly those travelling without official documentation, face high levels of vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking, either along their route or in their destination country. Libya, for example, remains a very dangerous country for migrants, with ongoing reports of murder, torture, rape, persecution, and enslavement of migrants by traffickers, militias, and even some state authorities. North Africans still lead the number of Africans crossing the

Mediterranean to Europe. The continued backsliding of democratic institutions and economic hardship in North African countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya will likely lead more people to look toward Europe. Africa has documented more than 9,000 migration-related deaths since 2014. More than 25,000 have also disappeared crossing the waters between Africa and Europe. Many countries continue to treat migration as a crime rather than a symptom, namely of limited economic opportunities and difficulty accessing safe, regular pathways for migrants.**(Chris,** *et al***., 2022).** In 2023, Serbia had to change its visa rules because of the illegal migrants, including Indians, flooding it as an entry point to Europe. Here's how the 'donkey route' works in Europe. (**Divya A , 1 January, 2024),** Last year, Serbia had to change its visa rules under pressure from the European Union. This was because the Balkan nation was being used by many, including Indians, as an illegal transit route to Europe. Belgrade's visa-free regime for Indians — along with nationals from Turkey, Tunisia, Cuba and Burundi — was being exploited to get into the bordering Austria, Hungary and Romania, and ultimately to Italy and France. Reason: those travelling to EU countries from Serbia don't require a visa. In October 2022, Serbia withdrew

visa-free arrivals from the above-mentioned countries. (**Divya A , 1 January , 2024),** The transit phenomenon came to light after European authorities recorded more than 1.3 lakh illegal immigrants in the first 10 months of 2022, many of whom were nationals of the countries allowed visa-free arrivals by Serbia. In the case of Indians, to show a "considerable travel history" on their passports, the migrants (mostly men of 25-40 years of age, with a major chunk from Punjab) were asked by their agents to enter Serbia after visiting destinations such as Nepal, Dubai and Armenia, so that they came across as genuine travellers to the immigration authorities, people in the know of the matter said. (**Suzanne L.,** *et al***, 14 October, 2022).** The recent case of a flight carrying 303 Indian nationals being grounded in France, ahead of its departure for Nicaragua, seems to bring to light a similar pattern — of creating a travel history to come across as tourists to immigration authorities of the receiving country, Nicaragua in this case, even as visa mandate for Indians in the central American country isn't very clear. (**Divya A , 1 January, 2024).**

Different Illustrative Images of Illegal Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert Pathways to European Countries

Source: The central Mediterranean migration route to Europe is the most trafficked — and most deadly
Image: Jesús Hellín/dpa/EUROPA PRESS/picture alliance .

February 2023: Migrants disembark in Naples, Italy, after being saved from a shipwreck in the Mediterranean Sea. © Getty Images

Gambian labourers build a shack in a tented slum near the village of Cassibile in eastern Sicily. Broader benefits of a new law allowing temporary legal residency for certain undocumented workers are unclear.

Tuesday, January 2, 2024 Illegal migrants continue to risk their lives in "coffins of death" to get to Europe (File photo).

Fonju, N.K.

Sarc. Jr. Art. Hum. Soc. Sci. vol-3, issue-3 (2024) pp-1-38

Divya A (1 January , 2024), Donkey routes: En route Europe, how Indians visit several countries to create 'travel history', New Delhi.,Victor Ayeni.

Image source, PA Media, Sam Hancock & Sam Francis, BBC News.

Tunisia: No Safe Haven for Black African Migrants, Refugees, July 19, 2023**.**

A man expelled to the Tunisia-Libya border by Tunisian authorities in early July shows his hand injury from a beating by Tunisian security forces, July 6, 2023. © 2023 Private

A man expelled to the Libyan border by Tunisian authorities shows his head injury, July 5, 2023. © 2023 Private.

Two young men or boys show their injuries on July 6, 2023, after arrest and expulsion to the Libyan border by Tunisian authorities. © 2023 Private

Black African migrants and asylum seekers walk in the desert near the Tunisia-Algeria border between July 5 and 7, 2023 after collective expulsion or forcible transfer there from Sfax, Tunisia, by Tunisian security forces. © 2023 Private.

Fonju, N.K.

Sarc. Jr. Art. Hum. Soc. Sci. vol-3, issue-3 (2024) pp-1-38

A man walks in the desert near the Tunisia-Algeria border between July 5 and 7, 2023, after groups of Black African migrants and asylum seekers were collectively expelled or forcibly transferred there from Sfax, Tunisia, by Tunisian security forces. © 2023 Private

Sudanese and Yemeni men show their refugee or asylum seeker cards on April 12, 2023 outside the International Organization for Migration (IOM) office in Tunis, after Tunisian police on April 11 used force and tear gas to disperse refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants and dismantled their makeshift camp in front of the nearby UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) office in Tunis. © 2023 Fethi Belaid/AFP via Getty Images

July 6, 2023 News Release,Tunisia: Crisis as Black Africans Expelled to Libya Border

Publisher: SARC Publisher

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From more findings, overall, 22 interviewees had suffered human rights violations at the hands of Tunisian authorities. Though the documented abuses took place between 2019 and 2023, the majority occurred after President Kais Saied in February 2023 ordered security forces to crack down on irregular migration, linking undocumented African migrants to crime and a "conspiracy" to change Tunisia's demographics. Saied's speech, which UN experts have called racist, was followed by a surge in hate speech, discrimination, and attacks. Fifteen people interviewed said they suffered violence by the police, military, or national guard including coast guard. This included a refugee and an asylum seeker beaten and electrically shocked by police during detention in Tunis. Five people said that authorities confiscated and never returned their money or belongings. The seven interviewees expelled to border zones in July said the military and national guard left them in the desert with insufficient food and water. While some were relocated back into Tunisia a week later by Tunisian authorities, others still needed assistance or were unaccounted for.(**Trapped in Tunisia: The deadly coast of clandestine ..., EL PAÍS English, https://english.elpais.com › trapped**..). At least nine people interviewed had been arbitrarily arrested and detained in Tunis, Ariana, and Sfax, where police profiled them based on their skin color. They said officers did not check their papers before arresting them, and in most cases neither conducted individual legal status assessments nor allowed them to challenge their arrest. A 31-year-old Malian interviewed had a valid residence permit when police arbitrarily arrested him in mid-2022 in Ariana. "They didn't ask me whether I had documents or not," he said. "My friend was arrested with me … a Guinean military officer who had come to Tunisia for medical treatment.(**Suhail, K. *et al*., 1 December, 2022**). He had a passport with a [valid] entry stamp." Five people recounted abuses during or after sea interceptions and rescues near Sfax, apparently by the maritime National Guard, also referred to as the coast guard. These included beatings, theft, leaving a boat adrift without a motor, overturning a boat, and insulting and spitting on survivors.(**Trapped in Tunisia: The deadly coast of clandestine ..., EL PAÍS English, https://english.elpais.com › trapped**..).Three civil society group representatives interviewed also described increasingly problematic coast guard practices since 2022, including beatings, dangerous use of teargas, shooting in the air,

taking or damaging boat engines and leaving people stranded at sea, creating waves that caused boats to capsize, delays in rescues, and theft of money and phones. Human Rights Watch wrote to the Tunisian Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministries on June 28, sharing research findings and posing questions, but received no response. In addition to the security force abuses, at least 12 men interviewed said they also experienced abuses by Tunisian civilians, including 10 assaulted or robbed and 5 forcibly evicted by civilian landlords. All but two incidents occurred after President Saied's February speech. In the months following Saied's speech, and in the context of Tunisia's deteriorating economic situation, worsening repression and xenophobic violence, and increasing boat departures and deaths at sea, over a dozen European officials visited Tunisia to discuss economic, security, and migration issues with Tunisian officials. The German interior minister noted the importance of "the human rights of refugees" and "creating legal migration routes," but few others publicly mentioned human rights concerns. The French interior minister said France would offer Tunisia €25.8 million to help "contain the irregular flow of migrants. (**Tunisia: No Safe Haven for Black African Migrants, Refugees,Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org › 2023/07/1).**

2. Approaching Diverse Actions from Receiving European Countries and Institutions Towards Sympathy and Minimum assistance of Immigrants through Hosting North African Countries
Following the plight of illegal immigration into Europe, the EU has already dedicated at least €93-178 million in migration-related funding to Tunisia cumulatively between 2015 and 2022, including by reinforcing and equipping security forces to prevent irregular migration and stop boats heading for Europe. The EU should suspend funding to Tunisian security forces for migration control and set clear human rights benchmarks for any further support, Human Rights Watch said. EU member states should withhold their support for migration and border management under the recently signed MoU with Tunisia until a thorough human rights impact assessment is carried out. In addition to the documented security force abuses, Tunisian authorities have failed to ensure adequate protection, justice, or support for many victims of forced evictions and racist attacks, at times even blocking such efforts. As a result, with respect to Black Africans, Tunisia is neither a safe place for

disembarkation of third country nationals intercepted or rescued at sea, nor a "safe third country" for transfers of asylum seekers.(**Tunisia: No Safe Haven for Black African Migrants, Refugees, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org › 2023/07/1).** Since March, Human Rights Watch has conducted phone and in-person interviews with 24 people – 22 men, 1 woman, and 1 girl – who lived in Tunisia, including 19 migrants, 4 asylum seekers, and 1 refugee, from Senegal, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, and Sudan. Nineteen had entered Tunisia between 2017 and 2022, twelve irregularly and seven regularly. For five interviewees, the dates and manner of entry were unknown. Some of those interviewed are not identified by name for their security or at their request. Human Rights Watch also interviewed four representatives from civil society groups in Tunisia – the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), Lawyers Without Borders (ASF), Euro Med Rights, and Alarm Phone, a rescue hotline network – as well as a volunteer who assisted refugees in Tunis; Elizia Volkmann, a Tunis-based journalist; and Monica Marks, a university professor and Tunisia expert. All seven had interviewed or assisted dozens of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Tunisia, and knew of or had documented cases of abuse by the police or coast guard. Among the migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees interviewed, nine had returned to their countries on emergency repatriation flights in March, while eight remained in Tunis, the Tunisian capital, or Sfax, a port city southeast of Tunis. Seven were among the up to 1,200 Black Africans expelled or forcibly transferred by Tunisian security forces to land borders with Libya and Algeria in early July 2023 (**Malcolm, B. et al., 7 August , 2023).**

The Tunisian Maritime National Guard (coast guard) approaches a boat at sea carrying people from different African countries seeking to get to Italy, near the coast of Sfax, Tunisia, Tuesday, April 18, 2023. AP Photo. The Tunisian police, military, and National Guard including the coast guard have committed serious abuses against Black African migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. With respect to Black Africans, Tunisia is neither a safe place for disembarkation of third country nationals intercepted or rescued at sea, nor a "safe third country" for transfers of asylum seekers. Tunisia should carry out reforms to respect human rights and end racial discrimination. The EU should suspend migration control funding

to security forces and set human rights benchmarks for further support. (Tunis) – The Tunisian police, military, and national guard including the coast guard have committed serious abuses against Black African migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, Human Rights Watch said today (**Malcolm, B. et al., 7 August , 2023).** Documented abuses include beatings, use of excessive force, some cases of torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, collective expulsions, dangerous actions at sea, forced evictions, and theft of money and belongings. Yet on July 16, the European Union (EU) announced the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Tunisia on a new "strategic partnership" and a funding package of up to €1 billion for the country, including €105 million for "border management, … search and rescue, anti-smuggling and return." Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte highlighted that the partnership would include focus on "bolstering efforts to stop irregular migration." The MoU, which must be approved formally by EU member states, failed to include serious guarantees that Tunisian authorities would prevent violations of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, and that EU financial or material support would not reach entities responsible for human rights violations. "Tunisian authorities have abused Black African foreigners, fueled racist and xenophobic attitudes, and forcibly returned people fleeing by boat who risk serious harm in Tunisia," said Lauren Seibert, refugee and migrant rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. "By funding security forces who commit abuses during migration control, the EU shares responsibility for the suffering of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in Tunisia.**"(Phillip C., 2024).** A group of Black migrants and asylum seekers of multiple African nationalities, including a woman and her baby, stranded in the desert for days after expulsion from Tunisia, stand in the buffer zone at the Tunisia-Libya border facing an Al Jazeera news crew and Libyan soldiers, July 11, 2023. Private Millions in EU and bilateral funding – particularly from Italy – have already supported, equipped, and trained the Tunisian coast guard, "internal security forces," and "land border management institutions." Border "externalization" – preventing irregular arrivals by outsourcing migration controls to third countries – has become a central plank in the EU's response to mixed migration and has led to egregious human rights violations. Support to abusive security forces only exacerbates human rights abuses that drive migration. "Both the EU and the Tunisian

government need to fundamentally reorient their approach to migration challenges," Seibert said. "Border control is no justification for trampling rights and ignoring international protection responsibilities."(**Malcolm, B. *et al*., 7 August, 2023).**

Tunisia is a country of origin, destination, and transit for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. In the first half of 2023, it has surpassed Libya as a departure point for boats arriving in Italy. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), of the 69,599 people who arrived in Italy between January and July 9 via Mediterranean Sea routes, 37,720 had departed from Tunisia, 28,558 from Libya, and others from Turkey and Algeria. The most common countries of origin for those arriving in Italy were, in descending order, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Syria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mali. Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea have faced widespread human rights abuses linked to conflict, coups, or government crackdowns in recent years. A 2021 official estimate said that 21,000 foreigners from non-Maghreb African countries were in Tunisia, whose population is 12 million **(Divya A. , 1 January , 2024).** The country hosted 9,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers as of January. Tunisia is party to the UN and African refugee conventions, and its Constitution provides for the right to political asylum. However, Tunisia has no national asylum law or system. UNHCR carries out registration and refugee status determination. Though international human rights standards discourage the criminalization of irregular migration, Tunisian laws dating from 1968 and 2004 criminalize the irregular entry, stay, and exit of foreigners, as well as organizing or assisting illegal entry or exit. Penalties include prison and fines. Tunisia has no explicit legal grounds for administrative immigration detention, but multiple organizations have documented arbitrary detention of African migrants. Tunisia permits 90-day visa-free travel with an entry stamp for several African nationalities. However, obtaining a residency permit can be difficult. According to the nongovernmental group FTDES, between January and May 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested over 3,500 migrants for "irregular stay" and intercepted over 23,000 people attempting irregular departures from Tunisia. FTDES spokesperson Romdhane Ben Amor told Human Rights Watch that most recorded arrests of migrants took place near the Algeria border, though hundreds also occurred in

Tunis, Sfax, and other cities following the president's speech.(**Allwell O. A., March 2023**).

There also existed collective expulsion to Libya and Algeria borders. Between July 2 and 5, 2023, Tunisian police, National Guard, and military conducted raids in and around Sfax, arbitrarily arresting hundreds of Black African foreigners of many nationalities with both regular and irregular legal status. Without due process, the National Guard and military expelled or forcibly transferred up to 1,200 people in several groups to the Libyan and Algerian borders. The authorities drove an estimated 600-700 people south to the Libya border near the town of Ben Guerdane, according to five interviewees expelled there.(**Migration flows on the Western routes - Consilium.europa.eu, Consilium.europa.eu, https://www.consilium.europa.eu › ...**). They drove hundreds of others west to various locations along the Algerian border in the Tozeur, Gafsa, and Kasserine governorates, according to two expelled people, UN representatives, FTDES, and Alarm Phone. The hundreds expelled to a remote, militarized zone at the Tunisia-Libya border included at least 29 children and 3 pregnant women. At least six were UNHCR-registered asylum seekers. People interviewed said that national guard or military officers beat and abused them during expulsions, including a 16-year-old girl who said she was sexually assaulted. They said security officers threw away their food, smashed their phones, and left them in a zone from which they could neither enter Libya nor return to Tunisia, with security forces of both countries pushing them back. They provided their GPS location on July 2-4 and videos and photos of expelled people, their injuries, smashed phones, passports, and consular and asylum seeker cards.(**Migration flows on the Western routes - Consilium.europa.eu, Consilium.europa.eu, https://www.consilium.europa.eu › ...**). On July 7, Human Rights Watch interviewed two people expelled or forcibly transferred to or near the Algerian border on July 4 and 5. They were in two groups, totaling fifteen people, including seven women – two pregnant – and one child. They said they were transported from Sfax in buses, forced to walk in the desert without adequate food or water, and pushed back by both Algerian and Tunisian security forces. A Guinean woman asylum seeker shared her group's GPS location in Gafsa governorate, while an Ivorian man shared his group's location in Kasserine governorate. They also provided videos of their groups walking in the

desert. In a July 8 statement, President Saied called allegations of abuses by security forces against migrants "lies" and "fake news." The weekend of July 8, Tunisian Red Crescent teams provided food, water, and medical aid to some migrants at or near the Algerian and Libyan borders. They were the only aid group Tunisian authorities allowed into the Libya border zone. On July 10, Tunisian authorities finally relocated more than 600 people from the Libya border to International Organization for Migration (IOM) shelters and other facilities in Ben Guerdane, Medenine, and Tataouine, according to UN representatives and an Ivorian man among those taken to Medenine, who provided his location. However, on July 11, Human Rights Watch spoke with two migrants saying they were in a group of over one hundred expelled people still stuck at the Libya border. They shared videos and their location. Migrants at both borders alleged to Human Rights Watch and others that several people had died or been killed following expulsion, though Human Rights Watch could not independently confirm their accounts. On July 11, Agence France-Presse reported that the bodies of two migrants were found in the desert near the Tunisia-Algeria border. Al Jazeera, who visited the Tunisia-Libya border area several times, published footage from July 11 showing two still-stranded groups of African migrants – over 150 people total – and the body of a migrant who had died. Tunisia is party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which prohibits collective expulsions; and to the UN and African Refugee Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibit forced returns or expulsions to countries where people could face torture, threats to their lives or freedom, or other serious harm. (Tunisia: No Safe Haven for Black African Migrants, RefugeHuman Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org › 2023/07/19).

Apart from the above, similar cases of torturing migrants were reported by national from other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, a Sudanese asylum seeker, who had camped outside the UNHCR office since November 2022, told Human Rights Watch that he and others had barricaded the area for protection, and on April 10 had entered UNHCR premises "to drink water and use the toilet." On April 11, he said, "It was the police who started the violence. They … came and fired [tear] gas at us. And that was the first time

the police threw stones at us – I saw two of them do it." He said he then saw some people throw stones back at police. After he fled the area, he said, the police beat and arrested him and others in the street. The police initially took about 80 to 100 people into custody at Lac 1 police post, including some women and children, and left the camp destroyed. They released the Sudanese asylum seeker along with others later that day, but transferred 31 men to Mornaguia prison under various charges including disobedience and assault, according to a Lawyers Without Borders (ASF) representative. ASF provided legal assistance to the accused, who were released in late April, with charges later dismissed for half the group and the other half awaiting a September hearing, the representative said. In addition,a Sierra Leonean asylum seeker, who had camped outside IOM and UNHCR since his eviction from his apartment in February, was among those arrested. Human Rights Watch reviewed a government document confirming his release from Mornaguia prison in late April. During the April 11 camp crackdown, he "saw one Liberian [asylum seeker] beaten by police … there was so much blood." He said he was not involved in violence but had recorded videos and made phone calls. He said police grabbed him, arrested him, and tortured him in detention: In the police van, one [officer] started choking me to force me to open my phone. …They took me to the police station in Lac 1. They separated three of us, me and a Sierra Leonean [asylum seeker] and the [injured] Liberian …[The police] put us in a private room, where they tortured us. [Two uniformed officers] used … a wooden stick … hitting us on our heads, ankles, places where your bones are … Two [other uniformed officers] gave us shocks with electronic devices like tasers … One [man in civilian clothes] …said to me in English, "You are … saying Tunisia is not safe … You fucking immigrants and refugees, you want to spoil our image."… The other police were insulting us in Arabic ... They tortured us … for around 45 minutes. A Sudanese refugee also told Human Rights Watch he was beaten and given electric shocks by police at the Lac 1 post before his transfer to Mornaguia prison. Tunis resident, who helped several men get medical assistance after release from Mornaguia prison in May, said two refugees, an Eritreans and a Central African, had described police using conducted electrical weapons such tasers on them during their arrest. He also said two Eritrean refugees told him that at Lac 1 post, "The police beat them … out of sight

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of the camera." The Sudanese asylum seeker who was detained and released the same day said he saw several African detainees taken to another room at the station and heard them crying in pain, and later some told him the police had used devices to give them electric shocks. The police violence had convinced him to leave Tunisia, he said: "I'm asking some people I know to help me to cross the sea, to be far away from this country." Of the six people Human Rights Watch interviewed who had attempted one or more boat journeys to Europe, five had experienced "pullbacks" - forced returns of outgoing boats, or other actions by authorities to prevent people from leaving a country outside of official border crossings. Pullbacks can violate individuals' rights to seek asylum and to leave any country, whether their own or another, trapping people in abusive situations. Five interviewees also described abuses by Tunisian authorities during or after sea interceptions (four) or rescues (one) near Sfax between 2019 and 2023. Salif Keita, a 28-year-old Malian repatriated in March, said he attempted a boat voyage in 2019, embarking from Sfax. "The national [coast] guard took our motor and left us stranded at sea," he said. "We had to break pieces of wood from the boat … to paddle ourselves back." An Ivorian man in Sfax attempted a sea journey in January 2022. He said the coast guard intercepted them and hit the passengers with sticks. While at sea, he said, he also saw a migrant boat whose passengers included children overturned by waves caused by a coast guard boat.(**Hamza M., March 20, 2023**).

A 32-year-old man from Mali had also attempted a sea journey. He had entered Tunisia regularly, but his entry stamp expired. Unable to obtain a residence permit, in December 2021 he embarked near Sfax in a boat with approximately 50 West and Central Africans. The authorities intercepted them within 15 minutes, he said: "They took peoples' money or phones ... Those who didn't have either, they hit and insulted them. I even saw an [officer] hitting one of the women … They took my phone." A 24-year-old man from Cameroon said the coast guard rescued him and others after their boat overturned near Sfax in April 2023. Once on land, the officers insulted, spat on, and beat him and other survivors, before releasing them. Moussa Kamara, a 28-year-old Malian in Sfax, had entered Tunisia in May 2022. In December 2022, he embarked near Sfax in a boat with around 25 West Africans. "After not even 30 minutes, the [coast] guard came [positioning their

boat alongside ours] and said 'Stop!' We didn't stop, so one of the national guards started to hit people with a baton ... they hit three men, including me … One of my friends was injured." The authorities took them to Sfax and released them. After this experience, Kamara remained in Tunisia, but Saied's speech and its aftermath changed his mind: "I decided to try [a sea journey] again. The president said to leave the country. If I didn't leave, I wouldn't find a place to live or work." "The president created a climate of terror for migrants in Tunisia, so many are rushing to leave," said Ben Amor of the Tunisian Forum, FTDES. "These past few months, the coast guard started to use tear gas to force [boats] to stop … And they target migrants who try to film them … they confiscate the phones after each operation." An Alarm Phone volunteer in Tunis said her team had collected similar accounts: "Since 2022, there is a pattern of behavior by Tunisian coast guards to try to attack the boats … using sticks to beat people, in some cases [using] tear gas … shooting in the air or toward the engine ... sometimes … leaving people stranded [at sea in disabled boats]." Many such practices were cited in a December statement by over 50 groups in Tunisia, and again in April. In 2020–2022, Tunisian illegal migrants traveled through Serbia to reach Western Europe, as an alternative to the hazardous, more monitored Mediterranean route. This was driven by push factors in Tunisia, including deteriorating economic conditions and government acquiescence, and pull factors in Europe, namely smuggling networks and Serbian authorities looking the other way. While the route was sealed for Tunisians in November 2022, as long as transit states can use illegal migration to secure geopolitical leverage, such actions will continue. Thanks to a fervent rsearcher, Hamza Meddeb who is a Research fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where he co-leads the Political Economy Programme, the stories and realities of the illegal immigrants in specific countries of Maghreb are coming to the understanding of the contemporary researchers of the domain (**Hamza M., March 20, 2023**).

According to Hamza, the deterioration of economic conditions in Tunisia following the COVID-19 pandemic and President Kais Saied's effective coup of July 2021, which isolated the country from international donors and investors, helped drive illegal migration as the following key issues are worthily noted: The Serbia route provided a safer, less monitored passage to

Western Europe than the Mediterranean route; Migrants from the marginalized region of Tataouine favored the Serbia passage especially and were helped financially by a regional diaspora living in Europe; The Tunisian state also welcomed the Serbia route. More migrants ensured higher remittances, while the government maintained deniability because Tunisians at the time required no visas for Serbia and Türkiye; Among the pull factors in Europe were smuggling networks, many from North Africa, who organized passage from Serbia to Hungary and beyond and Serbia's ambivalence toward illegal migration was another pull factor. Serbia used migrants as political leverage, until termination of the visa-free regime closed the route to Tunisians. In addition, some findings/and recommendations were also listed namely: Smuggling networks in Serbia, divided by ethnic affiliation, were highly adaptable, allowing them to satisfy the sudden increase in demand for their services in 2021 and 2022; Competition among smuggling networks produced a rationalization of migrant flows using social media platforms, financial transfer procedures, and systems of transportation and accommodation; In allowing migrants to cross its territory, Serbia secured advantage over the EU in a context of vanishing hopes of accession to the union, border disputes with Kosovo, and pressure to align with EU sanctions against Russia; Though the route was closed to Tunisians in November 2022, Serbian actions sent a message to the EU that only Serbia's accession would decisively resolve the migrant issue; Transit countries will continue to look the other way on illegal migration if it helps them to achieve political, financial, or geopolitical aims that are otherwise difficult to secure and The EU needs to offer a strategic horizon to countries in its neighborhood, one based on shared prosperity aimed at reducing illegal migration. Without an effective common system for dealing with illegal migrants, the EU will remain vulnerable to pressure.(**Hamza M., March 20, 2023**). This reflected a wider trend. According to Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 145,600 undocumented migrants took the Serbia route in 2022, 136 percent more than in 2021.[5] This was the highest number reported on this route since 2015, representing about half of all reported illegal entries into the EU in 2022.[6] The Serbia route illustrated the dynamics of manipulating migration flows in times of globalization and populism. It was a consequence of converging interests among state and nonstate actors as well as legal and illegal entities,

involving the Serbian and Tunisian states and agile migrant smuggling networks. All of them took advantage of the initial absence of a coordinated response by European countries to exploit weak spots in pursuit of their financial, social, or geopolitical goals.[7] This is a reality the EU will have to continue to take into consideration. It suggests that merely trying to deal with the push factors of illegal migration in countries of origin may not be enough, as the pull factors in states surrounding the EU are likely to remain substantial, even if these will vary from state to state, depending on circumstances. **Hamza M., March 20, 2023).**

In 2022, illegal migration from Tunisia continued to rise, with 18,100 arrivals in Italy, and 38,400 people prevented from completing the crossing, which indicated the success of tighter border control measures.[18] In 2022, they exceeded 9 billion dinars ($3 billion), which was 13.5 percent higher than in 2021.[34]In light of the Tunisian state's reliance on remittances, and amid growing pressure from Italy and the EU to curb illegal migration by sea, the Serbian route provided Tunis with plausible deniability for the waves for migrants heading toward Europe. The reason for this is that there were no visa restrictions for Tunisians traveling to Serbia and Türkiye. Tunisia saw no advantages in limiting their travel to these countries, and paid no price for allowing them to do so. However, soon after Saied's effective coup of July 2021, it was clear to the main Tunisian political actors that migration would be a fundamental factor in determining the international community's attitude toward the president's regime. Indeed, the last speaker of parliament before Saied suspended the legislature, Rached Ghannouchi, warned that in the absence of a restoration of democracy, "over 500,000 Tunisian migrants could try to reach the Italian coast in a very short time."[35] The defensiveness of Saied's response showed his sensitivity on the question. He declared that the opposition was paying Tunisians to embark for Europe, thereby damaging Tunisia's interests and relations with European countries.(**Hamza M., March 20, 2023).** This had an immediate effect when, in late October 2022, around sixty Tunisian migrants who had landed in Belgrade from Türkiye were obliged to return to Istanbul.[91] Less than a month later, on November 20, Belgrade imposed visa requirements on citizens from Tunisia and Burundi, signaling the apparent end to mass migration from Tunisia via the Serbian route. While Serbia ultimately bowed

to EU pressure, its actions managed to send a message to the EU that only Serbia's accession would decisively resolve the migrant issue, until which time uncertainty would remain on this front. Indeed, to become an EU member state, Serbia must align its visa policy with that of the EU countries. This means that sooner or later Serbia will have to introduce visa procedures not only for Tunisian citizens but also those of other countries who do not require visas to the Schengen area. Therefore, the illegal migrants transiting through Serbia were partly useful in pressing the EU on an acceleration of the enlargement process. This was all the more effective in a context where the EU's capacities to absorb refugees and migrants were overstretched due to the wave of refugees from Ukraine. Around 5 million Ukrainian refugees have been registered for national protection schemes in Europe since Russia's invasion of their country in February 2022.

Furthermore, another reality is that Africa and the EU are not equal trade partners. One obstacle is political in nature. Despite the idea of a "partnership of equals," the EU continues to impose a political agenda going well beyond trade issues, using grand strategies like the European Green Deal. These efforts may do more harm than good even if driven by good intentions. In the long term, free trade could have a more significant and sustainable impact on African governance than external impositions while respecting African countries' sovereignty and agency. Moreover, the EU may be pressed to curb its protectionist instincts and reduce the regulatory hurdles that block African products from the European market. Agricultural subsidies notably distort trade. The EU's rules-of-origin regime also remains complex and excessively demanding. European efforts to promote commerce with and within Africa must be grounded on reality; bans on agrochemicals, for example, are a double-edged sword, as they may compromise agricultural productivity in countries vulnerable to food insecurity. Likewise, the EU's push for organic farming in Africa must not ignore that only 0.2 percent of the continent's farmland is certified for this type of production (**Teresa N. P. ,** 29 **June, 2022).** Europe's concerns with African economies are intimately connected with migration, which now drives its approach to the African continent. That is particularly visible in the Sahel, which Between 2015 and 2021, the EU allocated €93.5 million to Tunisia from its "Emergency Trust Fund for Africa" (EUTF), which sought to combat irregular migration,

displacement, and instability. This included €37.6 million for "border management" and efforts against "migrant smuggling and human trafficking." A February 2022 EU document said the counter-smuggling/trafficking funding "provides for equipment and training for officers of the Internal Security Forces, as well as the Tunisian Customs."**(Jacopo B,, 24 November, 2022).**The same document said the EU would "designate" up to €85 million for migration-related projects in Tunisia in 2021-2022. It did not specify what had already been spent, though a February 2021 EU document stated, "A very significant EU-funded support programme, benefiting the Tunisian Coast Guard, is currently being implemented." As much as €55 million of the €85 million could have been allocated to supporting migration control in Tunisia, based on the breakdown in the 2022 document: border management (€25m, including support to the coast guard); migration "governance" and protection (€6-10m); legal migration and labor mobility (€20-25m); combatting migrant smuggling/trafficking (€12-20m); and returns (€5m). The 2022 document also details extensive bilateral support to Tunisia by Italy, Spain, France, Germany and other EU states. In addition to its "fund for migration cooperation (ca. €10 million)," Italy supplied equipment (vehicles, boats, and more) "for a total value of €138 million since 2011," and "technical assistance related to border control (2017-2018) ... for a total of €12 million," which included support to the Tunisian police and national guard. Germany also provided boats and vehicles, while Spain supplied IT equipment. The EU's 2021-2027 "Multi-Country Migration Programme for the Southern Neighbourhood," which encompasses Tunisia, incorporates some positive elements – support to development of asylum policies, legal migration pathways, civil society engagement – but still highlights support to "law enforcement action" and "border and coast guard authorities" for border control.**(Ursula Trummer,** *et al.,* **2022).** Problematic project indicators conflate sea interceptions and rescues ("number of migrants intercepted/rescued through SAR operations at sea" and "on land"). European politicians have repeatedly proposed various migration partnerships with Tunisia, including offshore processing centers, "safe third country" deals, and agreements that could allow returns of third-country nationals who transited Tunisia. International law admits the possibility of safe third country designations, which enable receiving countries to transfer asylum seekers on the

presumption that the country they travelled through, or some other country, can fairly examine their refugee claims and provide effective protection. UNHCR guidelines list conditions for such transfers, including respect for refugee and human rights law standards and "protection against threats to physical safety or freedom." The EU Asylum Procedures Directive requires non-EU member states to meet specific criteria to be designated "safe," including "no risk of serious harm." Given the documented abuses by security forces and xenophobic attacks against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Tunisia, in addition to Tunisia's lack of a national asylum law, it appears that Tunisia does not meet EU law criteria for a safe third country. Black Africans in particular should not be forcibly returned or transferred to Tunisia .**(Ursula Trummer, *et al*., 2022).**

In terms of effective recommendations European Parliament spoted out four main technical ways to combat illegal immigrants as follows: The European Parliament, in its negotiations with the EU Council on the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, should seek to limit the discretionary use of the "safe third country" concept by individual EU member states. EU institutions and member states should agree on clear criteria for designating a country a "safe third country" for purposes of returning or transferring third-country nationals, to ensure that EU member states do not erode protection criteria in their application of the concept, and determine publicly whether Tunisia meets these standards, taking into account the ongoing attacks and abuses against Black Africans in Tunisia. The EU and member states concerned should suspend funding and other support to Tunisian security forces for border/migration control, and condition any future aid on verifiable human rights benchmarks. The Tunisian government should investigate all reported abuses against migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees by authorities or civilians; ensure accountability, including through appropriate legal action; and implement reforms and oversight systems within the police, national guard (including coast guard), and military to ensure respect for human rights, end racial discrimination or violence, and refrain from adding to racial hatred or discrimination against Black Africans.. Reconstruction of a shipwreck: How Italy and Frontex could have prevented over 90 deaths in Cutro. On February 26, a boat carrying around 200 migrants capsized 40 meters off the Italian coast. Various agencies

failed to detect the risk and did not activate a rescue operation on time. An investigation by EL PAÍS with 'Lighthouse Reports' and other media outlets exposes the fatal chain of errors. María MartínDaniel VerdúLola Hierro, Jun 02, 2023 - 17:25 CEST In the early hours of February 26, at around 5 a.m. and after almost four days and four nights of sea crossing from Turkey, a wooden boat sank off the coast of Cutro, in southeastern Italy. Almost 200 people were crowded aboard the old vessel, mostly refugees from Afghanistan who had paid up to €9,000 to try to reach Europe. About 40 meters from the beach, strong waves rocked the boat; its hull ran into shoals and broke apart. At least 94 people died, including 35 minors. On Thursday of this week, the prosecutor's office of Crotone (Calabria) ordered a search of the headquarters of the two agencies involved in the operation (the Coast Guard and Guarda di Finanza) and made the first charges for negligence in the rescue tasks. The Summer Love — that was the name of the old recreational boat — did not arrive near the Italian shores by surprise. The ship had been on the radars of the Italian and European authorities hours before the shipwreck. The overcrowded boat, which got caught in a storm as it neared Italy, had been detected by Eagle 1, an aircraft operated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), almost six hours before a shipwreck that was the worst since the tragedy in Lampedusa in 2013, where 368 people died. But in the most decisive hours, Italian authorities looked the other way and the various agencies involved began to blame each other, or else to pass the buck to Frontex. Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni only traveled to the scene of the tragedy 11 days later.( ).

3. The Specific British Illegal Migration Bill (BIMB) and its Rightful Opposition (RO)
3.1. The Outline of BIMB
The Bitish Illegal Migration Bill (BIMB) is set to become law after the government won a final series of votes in the Lords. The legislation is central to the prime minister's pledge to stop small boats crossing the English Channel. Under the bill, the home secretary has a legal duty to detain and remove anyone entering the UK illegally. In a late-night debate in the House of Lords, peers rejected attempts to reinsert time limits on child detention and modern slavery protections**. (U.K Illegal Migration Bill 2022-23).**The bill will now go for royal assent and become law. Chris Mason: Big moment on small boats but solution still far off, How many people cross the Channel in small

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boats?How is the UK stopping Channel crossings? On Tuesday, the UN released an unusually critical statement, claiming the bill breaks the UK's obligations under international law. In a joint statement the UN human rights chief Volker Turk and the UN refugees head Filippo Grandi said the bill "will have profound consequences for people in need of international protection". "This new legislation significantly erodes the legal framework that has protected so many, exposing refugees to grave risks in breach of international law," Mr Grandi said. A Home Office spokesperson said the government took its international obligations seriously, and that nothing in the bill required the government to act incompatibly with international law. They added: "Our Illegal Migration Bill is a key part of our work to deter and prevent people from making small boat crossings, as it will see people who make these dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys detained and swiftly removed." As it stands it is unclear what will happen to people coming to the UK on small boats in the coming months, according to BBC home and legal correspondent Dominic Casciani. The bill places a legal duty on the government to detain and remove those arriving in the UK illegally, either to Rwanda or another "safe" third country. **(Why the U.K.'s 'Illegal Migration Bill' Is Probably Illegal, Time Magazine, https://time.com › uk-illegal-migrat...).** But there are no similar return deals with any other countries, our correspondent said. And the Rwanda plan was ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal last month, although ministers are challenging the judgment. On Tuesday, an accommodation barge arrived in Portland Port, Dorset, where it is due to eventually house 500 asylum seekers. The first asylum seekers are expected to board the Bibby Stockholm later this month, despite protests from locals. The prime minister's official spokesman said that the government wants to "open more" accommodation facilities for asylum seekers. For weeks, the government was locked in a battle over the final shape of the bill with the Lords, where a cross-party group of peers made repeated amendments. In the last few days, the bill passed between the House of Commons and House of Lords three times, in a process known as parliamentary ping-pong. Former Prime Minister Theresa May led a series of backbench rebellions in the Commons over plans to restrict access to the UK asylum system for victims of modern slavery. Under the bill the duty to remove anyone who comes to the UK illegally applies to victims of trafficking and

slavery, accompanied children and unaccompanied children as soon as they turn 18. Ms May, who as home secretary introduced the Modern Slavery Act, said the bill "will enable more slave drivers to operate and make money out of human misery". The government argued that anyone identified as a potential victim of modern slavery would be returned home or to another "safe country away from those who have trafficked them". However, on Monday Mrs May did not vote for an exemption from the bill for suspected victims of slavery to allow them to access support and co-operate with criminal proceedings against traffickers.**(Jacopo B,, 24 November, 2022).** The legislation would also scrap existing legal caps on how long those entering the UK illegally can be held ahead of being deported. MPs and peers had attempted to reinsert the three day-limit on how long children can be detained, as well as the 24-hour maximum for children unaccompanied by an adult. But the plans were dropped after they were again rejected in the House of Commons. The government had already made concessions on the detention of unaccompanied children, who will be granted immigration bail after eight days, and on pregnant women, for whom the current limit of 72 hours detention will be retained. Watch: Braverman "disappointed" with Rwanda ruling The end of the stand-off between peers and MPs paves the way for the bill to receive royal assent - when the King formally agrees to make the bill into an Act of Parliament, or law. During the Lords debate, Home Office minister Lord Murray of Blidworth said the number of small boat arrivals had "overwhelmed" the UK's asylum system and that accommodation was costing taxpayers £6m per day. "With over 45,000 people making dangerous Channel crossings last year this is simply no longer sustainable," he told peers, adding it was "only right" that the "business model" of human traffickers be broken. He urged the Lords to "respect the will of the elected House and the British people by passing this bill". Labour's shadow home secretary Yvette Cooper called he new law "a con which will only make the Tories asylum chaos worse". "The asylum backlog is a record high, the number of people in hotels is still increasing, the Rwanda plan is unraveling and June boat crossings were higher than last year," she said. 13 December 2023().

Human Rights Act, ECHR and Government accountability. Immigration and migrants' rights, Joint civil society solidarity statement on the Illegal Migration Bill, 10 May 2023. As a coalition

of 181 civil society organisations representing the human rights, migrant, refugee, asylum, anti-slavery and trafficking, children's, violence against women and girls, LGBTQI+, disability rights, health, LGBTQI+, housing, racial justice, criminal justice, arts, international development, environment, democracy, pan-equality, faith, access to justice, and other sectors, we call on Parliamentarians to urge the Government to immediately withdraw the 'Illegal Migration Bill'. We all deserve to live safe from harm and to be treated with compassion, dignity, and respect. But this shockingly cruel and inhumane Bill turns our country's back on people fleeing war and persecution, blocking them from protection, support, or justice at a time they need it most. **(Illegal Migration Bill 2022-23 - The House of Commons Library, The House of Commons Library, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk › ...).** The Bill is effectively a ban on asylum, extinguishing the right to seek refugee protection in the United Kingdom. It will put people seeking safety and a better life at risk of irreversible harm, with life and death consequences. This Bill attacks the very core of human rights, which is the fundamental belief that we all have human rights regardless of who we are or where we are from. Instead, it separates people into categories of 'deserving' and 'undeserving' of human rights. In stripping the most basic rights from people seeking safety and a better life, the Bill dismantles human rights protections for all of us. The Bill deliberately and unacceptably excludes an entire category of people from the protections guaranteed under our domestic laws and international obligations. It will almost certainly breach multiple international conventions and agreements, including the UN Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (ECAT). The Government has acknowledged that it cannot guarantee the Bill will be compatible with the ECHR, a legally binding instrument. The Convention represents the rights and values that we hold dear, including the right to life, protection from slavery and torture, and the right to liberty, which are all threatened by this Bill.(U.**K Illegal Migration Bill 2022-23).** Not only does the Bill substantially threaten human rights, it aims to shield the Government from accountability when it does violate those rights by reducing parliamentary and judicial scrutiny.

From the above the declaration of the British Prime Minister in **support to BIMB as follows:**
The support of the BIMB following the PM speech on action to tackle illegal migration came out on 14 April 2022. Where the PM Boris Johnson gave a speech on plans to tackle illegal migration. According to him for centuries, our United Kingdom has had a proud history of welcoming people from overseas, including many fleeing persecution. My own great-grandfather came from Turkey in fear of his life, because our country offered sanctuary for his outspoken journalism. And when you look back over the centuries as people have come seeking refuge or simply in search of somewhere to build a better life, you see this is the very stuff our history is made of. From the French Huguenots, to the Jewish refugees from Tsarist Russia, to the docking of the Empire Windrush, to the South Asians fleeing East Africa, to the many, many others who have come from different countries at different times for different reasons, all have wanted to be here because our United Kingdom is a beacon of openness and generosity, and all in turn have contributed magnificently to the amazing story of the UK. Today that proud history of safe and legal migration is ultimately responsible for many of those working in our hospitals and on the front line of our response to the pandemic, for more than 60 per cent of the England football team at the final of Euro 2020, for many of our country's leading figures in the worlds of business, art and culture, and, I'm pleased to say, for ever growing numbers of people serving in public life, including colleagues of mine like Nadhim Zahawi who escaped with his family from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Dominic Raab, whose Jewish father came to Britain from Czechoslovakia to escape Nazi Germany, and Priti Patel, whose family fled persecution in Uganda. PM speech on action to tackle illegal migration: 14 April 2022. So I'm proud that this government has continued the great British tradition of providing sanctuary to those in need, in fact, doing more to resettle vulnerable people in the UK – through safe and legal routes – than any other government in recent history. Since 2015 we have offered a place to over 185,000 men, women and children seeking refuge, more than the entire population of Sunderland and more than any other similar resettlement schemes in Europe. This includes almost 100,000 British Nationals Overseas threatened by draconian security laws in Hong Kong, 20,000 through our Syrian scheme, 13,000 from Afghanistan and to whom we owe debts of honour, and around 50,000 Ukrainians.

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And we are not only supporting British nationals and those settled in the UK to bring potentially hundreds of thousands of their extended family from Ukraine, we are also welcoming unlimited numbers of refugees from that conflict, as the British people open their homes, in one of the biggest movements of refugees to this country that we have ever known. And as we work with local authorities and the devolved administrations to welcome those coming from Ukraine into our communities, we will also find accommodation across our whole United Kingdom for all those who have come here previously but who are currently in hotels, because it makes absolutely no sense for the taxpayer to foot those bills, running to almost £5 million a day, with the sum total of those we accommodate being concentrated in just a third of local authorities. It is controlled immigration, through safe and legal routes, which enables us to make generous offers of sanctuary while managing the inevitable pressures on our public services such that we can give all those who come here the support they need to rebuild their lives, to integrate and to thrive. But the quid pro quo for this generosity, is that we cannot sustain a parallel illegal system. Our compassion may be infinite, but our capacity to help people is not. We can't ask the British taxpayer to write a blank cheque to cover the costs of anyone who might want to come and live here. Uncontrolled immigration creates unmanageable demands on our NHS and our welfare state, it overstretches our local schools, our housing and public transport, and creates unsustainable pressure to build on precious green spaces. Nor is it fair on those who are seeking to come here legally, if others can just bypass the system. It's a striking fact that around seven out of ten of those arriving in small boats last year were men under 40, paying people smugglers to queue jump and taking up our capacity to help genuine women and child refugees. This is particularly perverse as those attempting crossings, are not directly fleeing imminent peril as is the intended purpose of our asylum system. They have passed through manifestly safe countries, including many in Europe, where they could – and should – have claimed asylum. It is this rank unfairness of a system that can be exploited by gangs, which risks eroding public support for the whole concept of asylum.

There are currently 80 million displaced people in the world, many in failed States where governments can't meet their aspirations. In an era of mobile connectivity they are a call or a text away from potentially being swept up in the tide of people smuggling. …. They are betraying all those who do the right thing, who try to come here legally – through forms of migration or the safe and legal routes provided for refuge. They are undermining the natural compassion and goodwill that people have towards refugees in this country….. (U.K, 14 April, 2022).

Related contents includes: UK-Albania Joint Communique: Enhancing bilateral Cooperation in areas of common interest, PM statement on illegal migration: 13 December 2022, My five-point economic action plan for the G20, Immigration Rules archive: 27 February 2015 to 1 March 2015, Risks of illegal migration to the UK, UK government's contested illegal immigration plan to become law (Kylie Maclellan and Andrew Macaskill, 18 July, 2023)…… However, deportation flights to Rwanda are unlikely to start until next year at the earliest and will still hinge on a ruling by the Supreme Court on their legality later this year. ….. Last year, a record 45,755 people came to Britain in small boats across the Channel, mainly from France. More than 12,000 have arrived so far this year, a rate similar to 2022. (**Reported by Kylie MacLellan and Andrew MacAskill; Editing by Angus MacSwan and David Holmes).**

In addition, the Prime Minister of the UK and the Prime Minister of Albania, Mr Edi Rama, recently agreed to enhance cooperation in 3 main areas of common interest with the main focus on the fight against organised crime and illegal immigration. Safe and legal ways to get to the UK. There are a variety of safe and legal routes to enter the UK instead of smuggling. Under the UK Resettlement Scheme, the UK will continue to offer a safe and legal route to vulnerable refugees in need of protection. The Mandate Resettlement Scheme is a smaller global scheme that resettles refugees who have a close family member in the UK who is willing to house them. You cannot apply to the UK government for resettlement to the UK. You will need to have been assessed for resettlement by UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency). Many are illegal immigrants, subject to exploitation and abuse by employers or contractors Visit the UNHCR website for information for refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless people. 17 June 2022 , 27 November 2023.(**The New Public Health, 2023).**

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3.2. The British Popular Counter Reaction to BIMB as Dangerous Piece of Legislations to both Citizens and International Migrants signed by a delegation of 181 British Nationals

The Bill includes the unprecedented and alarming proposal to misapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, which empowers our judges to interpret laws in a way that protects our rights. Without that protection, individuals affected by this Bill are limited from getting justice when their rights are violated. The Bill hands vast delegated powers to the Secretary of State, including the power to amend laws in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, despite the fact that human rights are largely a devolved matter. The Bill would also enable Ministers to ignore interim measures from the European Court of Human Rights – a rare yet vital last resort to halt proceedings like deportations when people's lives are deemed at risk of extreme and irreversible harm. This Bill would almost certainly be unlawful domestically and internationally. The Bill signals to the international community that the Government intends to commit human rights abuses while evading scrutiny and accountability, setting a dangerous example to other states**. (Illegal Migration Bill 2022-23 - The House of Commons Library, The House of Commons Library, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk › ...).** More importantly, these cruel and inhumane plans are a stain on our collective moral conscience, attacking the values we cherish as a democratic, rights-respecting society. This Bill is a dangerous piece of legislation that will most certainly lead to irreparable harm, grave suffering, and possible deaths if enacted. We stand united in solidarity with the individuals and families who would be directly harmed, and oppose the Government's divisive attacks on refugees migrants, victims and survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery, and other people who move. We fiercely reject any attempts to undermine the universality of human rights.

We urge all Parliamentarians to urge the Government to withdraw the Bill.

Table 1: 181 Participants who Outrights Signed in their Portfolios Condemning BIMB of 2023

No	NAMES	OFFICIAL PORTFOLIOS
1	Dr Shabna Begum	Director of Research, Runnymede Trust.
2	Jasmine Mohammad	Safety4Sisters Northwest
3	Rev Caz Hague	Methodist Minister, Birmingham Circuit
4	Lilian Seenoi Barr	Director of Programmes, North West Migrants Forum
5	Katrina Ffrench,	Founder and Managing Director, UNJUST
6	Steve Cooke	Chair Derbyshire Refugee Solidarity
7	Leila Zadeh	Executive Director, Rainbow Migration
8	Kamran Mallick	CEO, Disability Rights UK
9	Rosalind Stevens	Project Manager, Civil Society Alliance
10	Yasmine Ahmed	UK Director, Human Rights Watch
11	Emily Graham	Head of Campaigns, Safe Passage International
12	Patricia Durr	CEO, ECPAT UK
13	Enver Solomon	CEO, Refugee Council
14	Kevin Hanratty	Director, Northern Ireland Human Rights Consortium
15	Sonya Sceats	Chief Executive, Freedom from Torture
16	Yo Dunn	Director, National Autistic Taskforce
17	James Pearson	Director of Policy & Practice, Alzheimer Scotland
18	Donna-Louise Cobban	CEO, Beyond Detention
19	Hugh Knowles and Miriam Turner	Co-Executive Directors, Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland)
20	Danny Sriskandarajah	CEO, Oxfam GB
21	Suzanne Swinton	Chief Executive, Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance
22	John Good	Acting CEO, ActionAid UK
23	Jim McCormick	Chief Executive, The Robertson Trust
24	Sneh Aurora	Director, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI)

25	Owen Temple	Chair, No To Hassockfield
26	Chris Minnoch	CEO, Legal Aid Practitioners Group
27	Pierre Makhlouf	Legal Director, Bail for Immigration Detainees
28	Debbie Ariyo OBE	Chair BASNET
29	Debbie Ariyo OBE	CEO AFRUCA Safeguarding Children
30	Kris Harris	Policy Coordinator, Project 17
31	Griff Ferris	Senior legal and policy officer, Fair Trials
32	Mark Kieran	CEO, Open Britain
33	Robert Moore	Company Secretary, North Wales Regional Equality Network
34	Fizza Qureshi	CEO, Migrants' Rights Network
35	Marguerite Hunter Blair	CEO Play Scotland
36	Lucila Granada	CEO, Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX)
37	Dr Judith Turbyne	Chief Executive, Children in Scotland
38	Clarissa Hanna	Chair, Faversham and Villages Refugee Solidarity Group
39	Paul Parker	Recording Clerk, Quakers in Britain
40	Sanchita Hosali	CEO, The British Institute of Human Rights
41	Hayley Nelson BEM	Director, Learn for Life Enterprise
42	Clare Henry	Management Committee, Exeter City of Sanctuary
43	Reverend Gerard Goshawk	Minister, Six Ways Erdington Baptist Church
44	Ailsa Dunn	Secretary Hay, Brecon and Talgarth Sanctuary for Refugees
45	Kerry Smith	CEO, Helen Bamber Foundation
46	Alison Pickup	Director, Asylum Aid
47	Stephanie Neville	Project Manager, Stories of Hope and Home
48	Elizabeth Long	Partnerships, Refugee, Asylum seeker & Migrant Action (RAMA)
49	Sattinder Collins	Chair, Tees Valley of Sanctuary
50	Julie Bishop	Director, Law Centres Network
51	Jane Grimshaw	Convenor Hastings Supports Refugees
52	Simon Cheng	Director, Hongkongers in Britain
53	Anna Lewis	CEO, Open Door North East
54	James Wilson	Director, Detention Action
55	Dr. Patrick Roach	General Secretary, NASUWT
56	Sacha Deshmukh	Chief Executive, Amnesty International UK
57	Simon Tyler	Director, Doctors of the World
58	Kate Alexander	Director, Scottish Detainee Visitors
59	Agnes Tolmie	Chair, The Scottish Women's Convention
60	Mark Courtice	Chair of Trustees, Southampton and Winchester Visitors Group
61	Dania Thomas	Director, Ubuntu Women Shelter
62	Avril Sharp	Policy Officer, Kalayaan
63	Jamie Balfour-Paul	Founder, Magic for Smiles
64	Gwen Hines	Chief Executive, Save the Children
65	Ted Britton	Chair of Trustees, WYDAN
66	Ros Holland	Chief Exec, Boaz Trust
67	Dennis Carney	Chair, Black Connection
68	Sandy Brindley	Chief Executive, Rape Crisis Scotland
69	Lade Olugbemi	The Nous Organisation
70	Revd Jide Macaulay	Chief Executive Officer, House of Rainbow CIC
71	Nick Beales	Head of Campaigns, RAMFEL
72	Martha Spurrier	Director, Liberty

73		Stroud District Together With Refugees
74	Clare Campbell	Operations Manager, Walking With in North Tyneside
75	Amanda Church-Mcfarlane	Co-CEO, Abigail Housing
76	Alan Gray	Chair, Forth Valley Migrant Support Network
77	Lisa Norcross	Project and Fundraising Manager, Kairos Housing
78	Helen Hodgson	Operations Director, Hope at Home
79	Chloe Wolfe	Charity Manager, Swindon City of Sanctuary
80	Sian Summers-Rees	Chief Officer, City of Sanctuary UK
81	Lilian Geijsen	European Director, Ben & Jerry's
82	Gill Tipping	Co-chair, Lewes Organisation in Support of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (LOSRAS)
83	Tim Hopkins	Director, Equality Network
84	Alphonsine Kabagabo	Director, Women for Refugee Women
85	Steve Newman	Chair, FODI (Friends of the Drop In for asylum seekers and refugees, Sunderland)
86	Gail Heath	CEO, Pankhurst Trust (incorporating Manchester Women's Aid)
87	Daniel Tsz Kin Kwok	Director, The Hong Kong Scots CIC
88	Maggie Pearse	Chair, BIASAN (Bradford Immigration and Asylum Support and Advice Network)
89	Zara Mohammed	Secretary-General, Muslim Council of Britain
90	Amy Lythgoe	Trustee, Together Now
91	Amanda Jones	CEO, Shropshire Supports Refugees
92	Robert Rae	Co-Director, Art27 Scotland
93	Angie Pedley	Co-ordinator, Craven District of Sanctuary
94	Angie Pedley	Co-ordinator, Craven Refugee Support Network
95	Charles Dobson	Chairman, Skipton Refugee Support Group
96	Will Sutcliffe	Chair, Bradford City of Sanctuary
97		National Committee, Women for Independence
98	Mhairi Snowden	Director, Human Consortium Scotland Rights
99	Kat Lorenz	Director, Asylum Support Appeals Project
100	Sarah Fenby-Dixon	Trustee, Refugee Aid Network
101	Andrew Jackson	Chief Executive, Upbeat Communities
102	Bridget Young	Director, NACCOM
103	Jenni Regan	CEO, IMIX
104	Rev Peta Evans	Senior Pastor, Metropolitan Community Church of North London
105	Catharine Walston	Chair of Executive, Cambridge Convoy Refugee Action Group
106	Catharine Walston	Trustee, Cambridge Refugee Resettlement Campaign
107	Georgina Fletcher	Chief Officer, Regional Refugee Forum North East
108	Alexandra Lopoukhine	Interim Executive Director, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
109	Fraser Sutherland	Chief Executive, Humanist Society Scotland
110	Pete Ritchie	Director, Nourish Scotland
111	Emma Ginn	Director, Medical Justice
112	Shameem Ahmad,	CEO, Public Law Project
113	Juliet Harris	Together (Scottish Alliance for Children's Rights), Director
114	Nancy Kelley	CEO, Stonewall
115	Jean-Pierre Moussally	community councillor of the agglomeration of Grand Calais Terres & Mers, EELV (French Green Party)
116	Liz Needham	Chair of Trustees, St Albans for Refugees

117	Angus Clark	Chief Executive, Herts for Refugees
118	Elayne Hill	CEO, Central England Law Centre
119	Daniel Boyle	Senior Parliamentary and Policy Officer, BEMIS Scotland
120	Margaret Lennon	Director, Bridges Programmes
121	Ros Gowers	Coordinator, Evesham Vale Welcomes Refugees
122	Efi Stathopoulou	Programmes Manager, Refugee Legal Support
123	Rosie MacPherson	Artistic Director & Joint CEO, Stand & Be Counted Theatre
124	Sadia Sikandar	Advisory Board, West End Refugee Services
125	Clare Moody	Co-CEO, Equally Ours
126	Isobel Ingham-Barrow	CEO, Community Policy Forum
127	Rose Caldwell	CEO, Plan International UK
128	Tamsin Cook	Co-Artistic Director, Mafwa Theatre
129	Emily Crowley	Chief Executive, Student Action for Refugees (STAR)
130	Andrea Simon	Director, End Violence Against Women Coalition
131	Dr Razia Shariff	CEO, Kent Refugee Action Network
132	William Gomes	Director, The William Gomes Podcast
133	Ewan Roberts	CEO, Asylum Link Merseyside
134	Mel Steel	Director, Voices in Exile
135	Sheila Mosley	Steering Group member, Quaker Asylum and Refugee Network – QARN
136	Sebastian Rocca	Founder and CEO, Micro Rainbow
137	Tom Brake	Director, Unlock Democracy
138	Chloe Crowther	Bristol Defend Asylum Seekers Campaign
139	Amos Schonfield	CEO, Our Second Home
140	Karen Pearse	Director, Positive Action For Refugees and Asylum Seekers
141	Eleni Venaki	Director, The Comfrey Project
142	Sue Lacey	Founder, Together100
143	Aderonke Apata	Founder and Chairperson, Manchester Migrant Solidarity
144	Gisela Valle	Director, Latin American Women's Rights Service
145	Sampson Low	Head of Policy, UNISON
146	Aderonke Apata	Founder and CEO, African Rainbow Family
147	Kayte Cable and Vicki Felgate	Co-Founders, Big Leaf Foundation
148	Ruhi Akhtar	CEO, Refugee Biriyani & Bananas
149	Jeannie Tweedie	Co-Director, Elm bridge CAN
150	Jabbar Hasan	Director, Iraqi Association
151	Suleiman Abdulahi	Managing Director, Horn of Africa People's Aid Northern Ireland
152	Naabil Khan	Volunteer Coordinator, STAR Exeter
153	Toni Soni	Centre Director, Coventry Refugee and Migrant Centre
154	Aisling Playford	Policy and Advocacy Manager, Rainbow Project
155	Miranda Reilly	Director, The Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees
156	Jeremy Thompson	Manager, Restore (a project of Birmingham Churches Together)
157	Jane Lees,	CEO, Community Works
158	Tim Naor Hilton	Chief Executive, Refugee Action
159	Lucy Nabijou	Coordinator, Haringey Welcome
160	Amber Bauer	CEO, for Refugees
161	Mia Hasenson	Gross, Executive Director, René Cassin, the Jewish

		voice for human rights
162	Mauricio Silva	IRD Coordinator, Columbans in Britain
163	Andrew Copson	Chief Executive, Humanists UK
164	Susanna Revolti	CEO, Borderlands
165	Victoria Marks	Director, ATLEU
166	Clare Moseley	Chair, Care4Calais
167	Jonathan Senker	CEO, Voice Ability
168	Chloe Trew,	Director, Participation and the Practice of Rights
169	Deborah Gold	Chief Executive, National AIDS Trust
170	Lee Jasper	Co-Founder, Blaksox
171	Deborah Coles	Executive Director, INQUEST
172	David Weaver	Chair, OBV
173	Danielle Roberts	Senior Policy and Development Officer, Here NI
174	Chris Jones	Director, State watch
175	Paul Hook	Director, Asylum Matters
176	Declan Owens	Co-Chair, Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers
177	Andrea Cleaver	CEO, Welsh Refugee Council
178	Declan Owens	CEO, Eco justice Ireland
179	Saqib Deshmukh	Interim CEO, Alliance for Youth Justice
180	Jess McQuail,	Director, Just Fair
181	Emma Hutton	CEO, Just Right Scotland

SOURCE: Compiled with information from: Human Rights Act, ECHR and Government accountability / Immigration and migrants' rights, Joint civil society solidarity statement on the Illegal Migration Bill, 10 May 2023

The Illegal Migration Bill was introduced in the Commons on 7 March 2023 and is due to have second reading on 13 March. Its purpose is to "prevent and deter unlawful migration, and in particular migration by unsafe and illegal routes, by requiring the removal from the United Kingdom of certain persons who enter or arrive in the United Kingdom in breach of immigration control". New duties to arrange removal and declare asylum claims automatically void. The Bill would create two new legal duties for the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The first is to make arrangements for the removal of people who enter the UK illegally after 7 March 2023, have no permission to be in the UK and did not come directly from a place where they fear persecution. The duty would apply regardless of whether the person has submitted a legal claim challenging their removal, including an application for judicial review. If someone meets those conditions, the Secretary of State has a second duty: to refuse to process any asylum claim they make, along with any claim that removal to their country of origin would be a breach of their human rights. Much of the rest of the Bill deals with the consequences of being subject to the arrangements for removal duty. Migrants can be detained under new powers and removed to countries considered safe. The Bill would provide new powers to detain

people who are covered, or potentially covered, by the arrangements for removal duty and their relevant family members. Detention could be in any place the Secretary of State considers appropriate. Existing statutory limitations on the duration of detention of families with children and pregnant women would not apply where they are detained under these new powers. During the first 28 days of detention, people detained under these bespoke powers would not be able to apply to the Immigration Tribunal for immigration bail or apply for judicial review. There would be some restrictions on removal if people have claimed asylum or made a human rights claim. This is despite the automatic inadmissibility duty stopping these claims being processed. Asylum seekers would normally be removed to their home country if that country is listed as safe. The list of safe countries would consist of the 27 EU countries plus Albania, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Asylum seekers from other countries would not be removed to their home country. They could only be removed to certain 'third countries', ones they are not a citizen of. There is a separate list of third countries considered safe, including Rwanda.

In addition, The Bill would create new rights of legal challenge. While such challenges are ongoing, a person subject to the arrangements for

removal duty cannot be removed from the UK. The intention is that these legal challenges are the only ones that can suspend the person's removal. The Bill accordingly refers to them as 'suspensive' claims. People with modern slavery cases would be disqualified from protections against removal

Modern slavery legislation would be amended so that potential or confirmed victims of trafficking or modern slavery who are subject to the arrangements for removal duty would be disqualified from certain provisions. These include the existing provision of a recovery period, during which removal is prohibited, along with support and temporary leave to remain. This would be subject to an exception for individuals cooperating with an investigation or criminal proceedings. The Government wishes to proceed despite doubts about human rights compatibility

Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the minister in charge of a Bill to make a statement before second reading to say the Bill is compatible with the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (s19(1)(a)), or that they are unable to make such a statement, but the Government wishes Parliament to proceed with the Bill nonetheless (s19(1)(b)). The Secretary of State has made a statement under section 19(1)(b) with respect to the Bill. The Bill's explanatory notes state that the Government is satisfied that the Bill's provisions are capable of being applied compatibly with Convention rights. However the Government's European Convention on Human Rights memorandum acknowledges that the approach taken in relation to modern slavery in particular is "radical" and "new and ambitious" (PDF), and that such an approach meant the Secretary of State was unable to make a section 19(1)(a) statement. There has been some speculation that the Government may anticipate adverse legal judgments as a result of the Bill, and that this may have implications for the UK's future membership of the European Convention. The Government has previously said that it would make a statement under section 19(1)(b) is if there is a more than 50% chance that the Bill may be found to be incompatible with Convention rights.

People who enter illegally would be unable to get citizenship for themselves or their children. The Bill would restrict people who have ever been subject to the arrangements for removal duty from being granted immigration status or British citizenship in future. This is unless the Secretary of State decides to exempt them to comply with the

UK's international treaty obligations or, sometimes, in "compelling circumstances". The restrictions on obtaining citizenship extend to their UK-born children. New powers to provide accommodation for unaccompanied children

The Home Office would be given powers to provide or arrange for the provision of accommodation and other support to unaccompanied children who are within the scope of the duty to remove, and to transfer a child from Home Office accommodation into local authority care (and vice versa). The provisions apply to England but there is a power to extended them to the other parts of the UK through regulations. Annual limits for the number of places offered under safe and legal routes The Secretary of State would be required to introduce an annual limit on the number of places to be provided under certain safe and legal routes of entry to the UK. The limit would be decided after consultations with local authorities and other relevant bodies. Illegal Migration Bill 2022-23

3.3. Warning from the U N Refugee Agency and UN Human Rights Office about BIMB: Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. Press releases

The U.K Illegal Migration Bill: UN Refugee Agency and UN Human Rights Office warn of profound impact on human rights and international refugee protection system, 18 July 2023.

GENEVA – The Illegal Migration Bill, which has now been passed by Parliament in the United Kingdom, is at variance with the country's obligations under international human rights and refugee law and will have profound consequences for people in need of international protection, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk and UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi warned today. The Bill extinguishes access to asylum in the UK for anyone who arrives irregularly, having passed through a country – however briefly – where they did not face persecution. It bars them from presenting refugee protection or other human rights claims, no matter how compelling their circumstances. In addition, it requires their removal to another country, with no guarantee that they will necessarily be able to access protection there. It creates sweeping new detention powers, with limited judicial oversight. "For decades, the UK has provided refuge to those in need, in line with its international obligations – a tradition of which it has been rightly proud. This new

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legislation significantly erodes the legal framework that has protected so many, exposing refugees to grave risks in breach of international law," Grandi said. The Bill denies access to protection in the UK for anyone falling within its scope – including unaccompanied and separated children – regardless of whether they are at risk of persecution, may have suffered human rights violations or whether they are survivors of human trafficking or modern-day slavery and may have other well-founded claims under international human rights and humanitarian law. "Carrying out removals under these circumstances is contrary to prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsions, rights to due process, to family and private life, and the principle of best interests of children concerned," said High Commissioner Türk. Most people fleeing war and persecution either do not have or are unable to access formal documents such as passports and visas. Safe and "legal" routes are rarely available to them. The 1951 Refugee Convention, for its part, explicitly recognizes that refugees may be compelled to enter a country of asylum irregularly. In the absence of viable removal arrangements with third countries, or without adequate operational capacity to remove large numbers of asylum-seekers, thousands can be expected to remain in the UK indefinitely in precarious legal situations. The legislation will exacerbate the already vulnerable situation of people who arrive irregularly in the UK, drastically limiting the enjoyment of their human rights, and putting them at risk of detention and destitution.

As a result, their rights to health, an adequate standard of living, and to work are at risk, exposing them to the risk of exploitation and abuse. "In addition to raising very serious legal concerns from the international perspective, this Bill sets a worrying precedent for dismantling asylum-related obligations that other countries, including in Europe, may be tempted to follow, with a potentially adverse effect on the international refugee and human rights protection system as a whole," Türk warned. "UNHCR shares the UK Government's concern regarding the number of asylum-seekers resorting to dangerous journeys across the Channel. We welcome current efforts to make the existing asylum system work more effectively through fast, fair and efficient case processing, that allows the integration of those found to be in need of international protection and the swift return home of those who have no legal basis to stay. Regrettably, this

progress will be significantly undermined by the new legislation. Cooperation with European and other partners along the routes through which refugees and migrants are moving is also key," said Grandi. All those who leave their country of origin to seek safety and protection elsewhere are entitled to the full respect of their human rights and dignity, regardless of their legal status, mode of arrival or any other distinction. "The UK has long had a commitment to upholding international human rights and refugee law. Such steadfast commitment is needed today more than ever," the UN Human Rights Chief stressed. "I urge the UK Government to renew this commitment to human rights by reversing this law and ensuring that the rights of all migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are respected, protected, and fulfilled, without discrimination. This should include efforts to guarantee expeditious and fair processing of asylum and human rights claims, improve reception conditions, and increase the availability and accessibility of safe pathways for regular migration," Türk said. **(UNHCR: London: Liana Bianchi, 2023).**

Beside the above, the EU and its member states have taken a number of measures to address the migration situation on the Western Mediterranean and Western African routes. Western Mediterranean route , Western African route , EU action to address the root causes of migration in Africa , Infographic - Migration flows: Eastern, Central and Western routes The Western Mediterranean route refers to irregular arrivals in Spain, both via the Mediterranean Sea to mainland Spain and by land to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa. Migrants transit through Morocco and Algeria to reach Spain. In 2018, the Western Mediterranean route became the most frequently used route into Europe. After the peak of arrivals in 2018, arrivals steadily decreased from 2019 onwards due to a variety of factors, and above all: increased efforts by Morocco to fight illegal migration, close cooperation between Morocco, Spain and the EU and the COVID-19 pandemic. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) supports Spain in controlling its external borders on the mainland through joint maritime operations such as Operation Indalo. The officers, vessels and other surveillance assets deployed by the agency assist the national authorities with border surveillance and search and rescue. December 2022 the EU and African partners launched Team Europe Initiatives (TEI), which among other things

focuses on the Western Mediterranean and Western African routes to ensure joint efforts by member states and the EU to address migration challenges. This includes a specific initiative that mobilises €950 million to work with relevant African partners. European Cooperation on Coast Guard Functions (Frontex). The Western African route refers to irregular arrivals in the Canary Islands, in the Atlantic Ocean. Migrants depart mainly from Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia and embark on dangerous journeys along the West African coast to reach the Canary Islands. The distance covered ranges from less than 100 kilometres from the nearest point on the African coast to more than 1600 kilometres from The Gambia. In 2006 over 31 000 irregular migrants arrived in the Canaries. This was known as the Cayucos crisis, named after the popular fishing boats from Senegal and Mauritania. In the following years the number of irregular arrivals dropped to less than 1 500 arrivals per year.(**Cato Institute, 2019).** After a significant increase in 2020 and 2021, the number of irregular arrivals decreased again in 2022. EU support on migration in Morocco (European Commission) EU measures in countries of transit. Following the substantial increase in arrivals recorded in 2018 on the Western Mediterranean route, the EU launched a number of new initiatives with partner countries, including intensified cooperation within the EU-Morocco partnership. Among the areas covered by the cooperation with Morocco are: border management, socio-economic integration, institutional support and capacity building and protection and rights of migrants. The EU is in close contact with authorities from other transit countries to step up the ongoing cooperation in managing migration. EU action to address the root causes of migration in Africa. Valletta process. In November 2015 the Valletta summit on migration brought together European and African heads of state and government in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address the current challenges and also the opportunities from migration. Leaders participating in the summit adopted a political declaration and an action plan designed to: address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility, reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, prevent and combat irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration, ().

CONCLUSION

From our findings, the practices of illegal migration and attempted solutions on the platform of the British and European Union are not actually favourable to the wellbeing of African youths who were affected by the pull and push factors. It is true that certain funds were made available to some quarters and at the same time doubting whether the youths are even having the positive impact of the funds since corruption in most African countries are the order of the 21st Century. The EU emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa was launched by European and African partners at the Valletta Summit on migration in November 2015. Its activities focus on four strategic objectives: broadening economic and employment opportunities, strengthening resilience of communities, improving migration management, improving governance and conflict prevention. To date, 248 actions have been approved across the three regions covered by the EUTF for Africa (North of Africa; Sahel and Lake Chad; Horn of Africa), for a total amount of approximately €4.9 billion of funding. Specific funds from the EUTF support projects and activities that tackle the root causes of irregular migration and improve migration management in the main countries of origin, departure and transit. The results of the EUTF for Africa have been successful so far, with: 127 800 jobs created, 668 500 people assisted in developing income-generating activities, 9.5 million people receiving basic social services, 4.4 million people receiving nutrition assistance, 509 000 migrants in transit and forcibly displaced people protected, 2 million people notified by information campaign of the risks connected with migration, 2100 victims of trafficking assisted, 1.9 million people participating in conflict prevention and peace building activities and EU emergency trust fund for Africa (European Commission). In addition, European Union - African Union summit. (**Infographic - EU emergency trust fund for Africa).** The heads of state or government of the member states of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) met for the sixth European Union - African Union summit in Brussels on 17 and 18 February 2022. EU and AU leaders agreed to an enhanced and reciprocal partnership for migration and mobility. The EU and the AU will continue to address all aspects of migration and mobility, in line with national competences, in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced manner 21 November 2023 (**Risks of illegal migration to the UK 17 June, 2022).** This puts migrants' lives

at serious risk during every journey. Dangers of illegal travel to the UK by boat or lorry many people have died or been seriously injured trying to travel to the UK in a small boat or by lorry - including children. The dangers of travelling to the UK hidden in a lorry include: A person could be run over while trying to climb onto a moving vehicle, risk freezing to death inside a refrigerated vehicle, could easily suffocate in a sealed container or lorry, be injured by items falling on top of you and fall off into the road or underneath the lorry.(**Human Rights Act, 10 May 2023).** Concerning the danger of people smugglers, the people who arrange your journey are often part of organised crime gangs and may force you into dangerous situations to pay off your debt to them.

The government is changing the law so that people who arrive in the UK illegally will not be able to stay, and will instead be liable for detention and then promptly removed, either to their home country or a safe third country. The new Illegal Migration Bill will speed up the removal of those with no right to be in the UK and crack down on people abusing modern slavery protections with relocation to Rwanda. From 1 January 2022, you will be considered for relocation to Rwanda if you make an illegal journey to the UK and have travelled through or have a connection to a safe country. People relocated to Rwanda will have their asylum claim processed there. Rwanda will have full responsibility for them. People whose claims for protection are rejected will either be offered the chance to stay in Rwanda or return to their home country – they will not return to the UK once their claims have been decided by Rwanda. This situation is a total sign of danger which if not properly check by other neighbouring countries like Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, there will be future sporadic crises and genocide cropping from the British –Rwanda deal of relocating illegal migrants in Rwanda camps. However, illegal immigrants risk their lives and freedom when crossing Northern borders, particularly when being smuggled in overloaded or unsafe boats. Many immigrants are caught and detained or returned to their country of origin where they can be imprisoned. Others, if escaping from persecution may apply for refugee status which, depending on the policies of the Northern state, can lead to confinement in refugee camps, sometimes for years at a time, or freedom to move and seek work while their claims are processed. As North–South inequalities spiral, it is likely that legal and illegal forms of immigration will

continue to grow. (**A. McGregor, D. 2009**). Our recommendations are that African government does not needs again huge funds with huge rate of interests which the States are unable to pay with accumulated principal and interests in future. But, effective transformation industrial sectors which can be profitable to the recruitment of the youths are very necessary. In fact, those special funds should be directed to the opening of more visible industries and the promotion of technological sectors where African youths can be well train in different technical services which the Western European claimed to be the sole owners of such technological know-how in the labouir markets. Nevertheless, the Government of Rwanda should think twice before accepting the relocation of illegal migrants from the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU countries as attempts to gain favour which may in future turn into another syndrome of the 1994 genocide. They should know that among the migrants, there are also high class criminals which are capable of committing the type of unbearable crimes which the State can control any longer. As a solution, the British Government can deport the illegal migrants directly to their home countries with necessary support especially in her former overseas colonies where her agents committed colonial atrocities, looting and massive exploitation of human and natural resources for the development of their own country. However, there is much "Great Fear" in terms of new wave of social and political instabilities in the Great Lakes Region if illegal migrants from UK are resettled in Rwandan soil which is already a cursed land since the 1994 cold bloody slaughtering of human beings popular known as the Genocide.

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